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This thesis compiles and evaluates arguments for and against the success of 
Operation Unified Protector. In addition to investigating claims about the intervention, 
this study collects existing data on relevant issues such as the number of deaths and 
human rights abuses in Libya during and after the intervention to determine whether 
claims about the intervention are accurate. This thesis finds that supporters of the 
intervention were correct in arguing that the intervention was both justified and upheld 
its commitment to protecting human life and human rights. While this thesis finds the 
intervention to be a qualified success, it also suggests how states may better prepare for 
security issues in future interventions. Ultimately, this thesis finds that Operation 
Unified Protector was both warranted and mitigated violence perpetrated by the Gaddafi
regime, thus upholding the international community’s goal of protecting human life and
human rights.
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I. Was UN/NATO Intervention Justified and Did it Do More Harm Than Good?
Was the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya, Operation Unified Protector, a 
success or failure? Initially, actors in the global community championed the 
intervention as a success, citing the unprecedented multilateral effort to protect civilians
in their demand for human rights and autonomy. However, as the situation in Libya 
deteriorated, opinions shifted drastically and today many condemn Operation Unified 
Protector as an abject failure. In years after the intervention, authors continue to 
criticize the intervention as a destabilizing force that plummeted Libya into chaos, 
increased threats of terrorism and war, and halted the growth of a new democracy––a 
sharp rebuke to authors who supported the intervention as a successful humanitarian 
cause. Today, a full assessment of Operation Unified Protector is unavailable. This 
study compiles and then investigates a range of criticism of an intervention that was 
once largely considered to be both necessary and successful. In addition, this thesis 
discusses security issues after the intervention in Libya and what lessons the 
international community can learn from subsequent issues. After a full evaluation, it can
be determined that Operation Unified Protector was a qualified success and can inform 
future decisions in regard to humanitarian intervention.   
On March 17th, 2011 the United Nations (UN) Security Council authorized the 
use of force in protecting the Libyan people from state perpetrated violence with UN 
Resolution 1973.1 On March 23rd, 2011 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) assumed control over the intervention, Operation Unified Protector, and led a 
seven month long military intervention that included an air campaign as well as the 
1United Nations, Security Council, Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, Authorizing 
‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions.
deployment of 21 naval assets as the international community sided with rebels in 
opposition to the government of the then dictator Muammar Gaddafi.2  
In the third section, this thesis compiles and reviews the arguments for the 
necessity of intervention and arguments for the operation’s success in meeting 
humanitarian goals. Some supporters maintain that the intervention was both necessary 
and successful, while others find it was only necessary and did not constitute an 
overwhelming success.3 The primary justification these supporters agree on emphasizes 
state-perpetrated violence as evidence of an impending bloodbath, arguing that 
international intervention was necessary to protect human life and human rights. 
Additionally, some supporters argue that a Libya without an intervention would have 
been a much bloodier state and thus the intervention succeeded in its primary goal of 
protecting the Libyan people. However, this view of the intervention is not without 
opposition. 
The fourth section of this thesis collects and evaluates the most comprehensive 
criticisms of the intervention. While various authors have criticized the intervention, 
this thesis addresses the most thorough criticisms of the operation and its impacts on 
Libya.4 Leading critics argue that the intervention was both unwarranted and led to 
2NATO. “Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR Final Mission Stats.”
3Bellamy, Alex J.,"Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm," Ethics & 
International Affairs 25, no. 3 (2011); Daadler, Ivo and Stavridis, James, “NATO’s Success in Libya.” 
New York Times; Hamid, Shadi,“Everyone says the Libya intervention was a failure. They’re wrong.” 
Brookings Institute, April 12, 2016; Kristof, Nicholas, “Thank You, America!” The New Yorker, 
September 1, 2011.
4Carpenter, Ted Galen, “Paved with Good Intentions." Mediterranean Quarterly 29, no. 4 (2018);” 
Friedman, Benjamin, “No, the Libya Intervention Wasn't a Humanitarian Success,” Cato Institute, April 
7, 2016;” Kuperman, Alan, “A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATO's Libya 
Campaign,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2013; Kuperman, Alan, “Lessons from 
Libya: How Not to Intervene,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, September 2013;” 
Kuperman, Alan J., “Obama's Libya Debacle: How a Well-Meaning Intervention Ended in Failure,” 
Foreign Affairs, August 14, 2019. 
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devastating consequences by plummeting Libya into chaos.5 Primary criticisms include 
the notion that intervention worsened violence in Libya, led to increased terrorist 
activity, caused the loss of Libyan weapons, and harmed nuclear non-proliferation 
efforts. However, critics must minimize the threat Gaddafi posed to civilians to make 
their case and often blame the intervention for consequences that were not connected to 
the operation. While these critiques highlight potentially very serious issues, upon close 
evaluation, these strong criticisms do not completely dismiss the case for intervention 
and this study ultimately finds that the case for intervention outweighs unintended 
consequences.     
In the fifth section, this thesis investigates death figures as well as tabulations of 
human rights violations that ultimately prove supporter arguments that there was a 
significant humanitarian threat to the people of Libya. Both Muammar Gaddafi’s 
threatening rhetoric as well as violence against Libyan civilians illustrate that Gaddafi 
was determined to maintain power by any means necessary, thus posing a severe threat 
to those who opposed him. By proving that there was a major threat to human life 
present, this thesis also argues that the intervention succeeded in upholding its stated 
goal of protecting human life and human rights. This is not to overlook the deaths of 
those who perished in Libya, but to argue that the intervention prevented Gaddafi from 
inflicting further harm. As this section is primarily a response to criticism, the next step 
is addressing criticisms of the intervention.  
5Carpenter, Ted Galen, “Paved with Good Intentions." Mediterranean Quarterly 29, no. 4 (2018);” 
Friedman, Benjamin, “No, the Libya Intervention Wasn't a Humanitarian Success,” Cato Institute, April 
7, 2016;” Kuperman, Alan, “Lessons from Libya: How Not to Intervene,” Belfer Center for Science and 
International Affairs, September 2013;” Kuperman, Alan J., “Obama's Libya Debacle: How a Well-
Meaning Intervention Ended in Failure,” Foreign Affairs, August 14, 2019.
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The sixth section closely examines individual criticisms regarding an alleged 
increase in violence, increased terrorist presence, weapons proliferation, and harm to 
nuclear nonproliferation efforts. This section ultimately finds that there is a lack of 
evidence to prove that the intervention caused significant harm in any of these areas. 
While violence has continued in Libya post-2011, there is little evidence to suggest that 
Operation Unified Protector directly worsened violence in the state, thus the 
intervention cannot be blamed for an increase in violence. Similarly, due to weak links 
between the intervention and increases in terrorist activity as well as the relatively small
harms that terrorist activity caused in this region, terrorism does not provide sufficient 
grounds for condeming the entire intervention. Likewise, intervention is associated with
some conventional weapons proliferation. Further, the intervention perhaps damaged 
nuclear nonproliferation efforts. However, neither issue clearly outweighs the dire 
humanitarian situation in Libya and it is unclear that potential nuclear state behavior 
was conditioned by the lessons in Libya. Therefore, this section establishes that there is 
no clear causal link between Operation Unified Protector and a significant amount of 
the turmoil in Libya post-intervention. 
In the concluding section, this thesis finds that the intervention was justified and 
was a qualified success. However, security issues such as increased terrorist activity, 
conventional weapons proliferation, and hindered nuclear non-proliferation efforts 
revealed lessons to be learned and applied to future humanitarian crises. Such lessons 
include the necessity of preemptively preventing terrorist activity and the importance of 
securing weapons, both issues that can inform future decisions regarding intervention. 
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Ultimately, this thesis finds that Operation Unified Protector was both warranted and 
successful in upholding its commitment to protecting human life and human rights. 
This thesis uses a qualitative case study method, examining a mix of primary 
and secondary sources to determine whether Operation Unified Protector was justified 
and successful, and investigates to what extent the intervention caused subsequent 
events in Libya. A primary aspect of this thesis is the analysis of the counterfactual 
scenario in Libya in which the international community did not intervene. The accuracy 
of the counterfactual scenario based on available evidence is critical in weighing 
whether or not no intervention would have been better or worse for the Libyan people. 
Overall, the analysis is broken into, first, the scrutinization of conditions before and 
after the intervention, and second, the interrogation of links between international 
intervention and further removed strife in Libya. 
To determine whether or not the intervention was warranted, this thesis involves
a thorough examination of violence and the disputed but clear potential for violence in 
Libya as justification for foreign intervention to prevent further deaths and human rights
abuses. In investigating the situation, this thesis considers both the critic’s perspective 
that there was no outstanding threat to human life and human rights in Libya as well as 
primary and secondary sources regarding the actual situation on the ground at the time. 
This examination also requires consideration of the counterfactual scenario, one with no
intervention, to determine whether or not intervention was truly necessary to prevent 
further harm to the Libyan people.
The most potent criticisms focus on the supposed role the intervention had in 
destabilizing Libya. To assess these criticisms, this thesis utilizes close process tracing 
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to determine whether or not there is a clear causal link between the intervention and 
subsequent issues including increased death and violence; conventional weapons 
proliferation; impacts on nuclear proliferation; and increased terrorist activity. For 
instance, investigating whether or not there is a clear causal link between the 
intervention and the appearance of Libyan weapons in Mali, and, whether or not their 
appearance was inevitable. This process is applied to these four key areas: increased 
death and violence; increased terrorist activity; conventional weapons proliferation; and 
consequences for nuclear non-proliferation efforts, as they are the the most pressing 
criticisms and potentially the biggest harms to international security. Therefore, by 
scrutinizing this intervention and the proposed connections from the intervention to 
each particular issue, this thesis determines whether or not NATO can truly be held 
accountable for these breakdowns in security. 
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II. Background to the 2011 International Intervention in Libya
In 1951, Libya gained its independence from France and Britain under King 
Idris al-Sanusi and shortly after discovered oil reserves, beginning a new age of 
autonomy.6 King Idris al-Sanusi sought ties with the US and Britain but gradually 
increased Libyan autonomy as the state began to profit from oil revenue.7 The king 
maintained socially conservative policies and strong control over state affairs, 
provoking criticism from the Libyan people.8 In 1969, Muammar Gaddafi won power 
through a non-violent coup, beginning his 42-year rule.9 
Muammar al-Gaddafi was born in 1942 in the Sirte region to poor parents and 
rose to power through his military career.10 Despite humble beginnings, Gaddafi’s 
parents arranged for his education and he eventually attended the University of 
Benghazi, then known as the University of Libya.11 He later left the school to join the 
military and in 1965, graduated from the Libyan military academy.12 Gaddafi was an 
admirer of Gamal Abdel Nasser both for his Arab nationalism as well as socialist 
programs.13 With a vision of political upheaval and military support, Gaddafi embarked 
on his quest to transform Libya.   
On September 1st, 1969, a group of revolutionaries took control of the 
government and, with no military resistance, took King Idris and his appointed heir into 
6Encyclopædia Britannica, “Muammar Al-Qaddafi,” Encyclopædia Britannica, January 1, 2020.
7Al Jazeera. “Libya's Forgotten King.” Al Jazeera, November 19, 2015. 
8Encyclopædia Britannica. “Idris I.” Encyclopædia Britannica, May 21 2019.
9 Encyclopædia Britannica, “Muammar Al-Qaddafi,” Encyclopædia Britannica, January 1, 2020.
10Al Jazeera, “Profile: Muammar Gaddafi.” Al Jazeera, August 22, 2011.
11Encyclopædia Britannica, “Muammar Al-Qaddafi,” Encyclopædia Britannica, January 1, 2020.
12Encyclopædia Britannica, “Muammar Al-Qaddafi,” Encyclopædia Britannica, January 1, 2020.
13 “The Twentieth Century: Muammar Al-Qaddafi,” Dictionary of World Biography: The 20th Century, 
O-Z, ed. Frank Magill (Routledge, 1999), 3,098. 
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custody.14 Shortly after, the king left Libya, indicating that he would not return.15 
Muammar Gaddafi was then appointed as the head of state, as Alison Pargetet puts it, 
“there was no doubt that the enigmatic Qaddafi would lead the way.”16  
In 1973, Gaddafi declared the beginning of a new revolution, leading to 
significant changes to Libyan government.17 The new revolution involved a complete 
governmental upheaval, weakening previous leaders such as local mayors and instead 
creating people’s militias to uphold the principles of the regime and eliminate any 
opposition.18 Gaddafi also championed a new “Third Theory” rooted in Islam as the true
means of achieving success as opposed to other systems such as capitalism or 
communism.19 Gaddafi’s The Green Book, which was published in 1975, codified his 
teachings on the importance of direct democracy, advocated for socialism as preferable 
to capitalism, and emphasized the importance of nationalism as a driving force in 
history.20 In an unexpected escalation, a 1976 government response to student protests 
involved the arrest of students and later, the public hanging of dissenters.21 Gaddafi also
created a “revolutionary authority” and divested the people’s authority of power, 
controlling power behind the scenes behind a facade of popular authority.22 
Additionally, Gaddafi began deploying paramilitary groups to control populations 
throughout the state, beginning in 1976 and officially taking form in 1979.23 Even more 
14Library of Congress, Libya: A Country Study, ed. Helen Chapin Metz (Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress, 1989), 42. 
15Library of Congress, Libya: A Country Study, ed. Helen Chapin Metz (Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress, 1989), 42. 
16Pargeter, Alison, Libya: The Rise and Fall of Gaddafi (London: Yale University Press, 2012), 67.
17Vandewalle, Dirk, A History of Modern Libya (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 83.
18Pargeter, Alison, Libya: The Rise and Fall of Gaddafi (London: Yale University Press, 2012), 79.
19Pargeter, Alison, Libya: The Rise and Fall of Gaddafi (London: Yale University Press, 2012), 80-81. 
20Libya - The Green Book, countrystudies.us/libya/80.htm. 
21Pargeter, Alison, Libya: The Rise and Fall of Gaddafi, (London: Yale University Press, 2012), 94.   
22Pargeter, Alison, Libya: The Rise and Fall of Gaddafi (London: Yale University Press, 2012), 95-96.
23Pargeter, Alison, Libya: The Rise and Fall of Gaddafi (London: Yale University Press, 2012), 97.
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sinister, Gaddafi prohibited media other than government-approved propaganda and 
sought to eliminate any individual leaders who might disrupt the movement by 
employing committees that created a McCarthy-esque era as they tried and executed 
those suspected of treason.24 
Under the new regime, the Libyan economy and people suffered as the state 
prohibited private business, leaving the population in a state of panic and scarcity.25 No 
one was safe, as Gaddafi imposed stringent restrictions on the economy, government, 
and even the practice of religion in Libya.26 Growing resentment manifested in failed 
attempts to stage a coup against Gaddafi, indicating a build up of tensions.27 In 
response, Gaddafi infiltrated local leadership in an effort to extinguish opposition in 
Libyan tribal factions.28 However, several opposition groups remained in exile, biding 
their time as they sought to overthrow Gaddafi.29 Efforts became increasingly 
aggressive, resulting in Gaddafi’s crackdown on opposition in the late 90s and 
authorization of governing bodies to seek out and eliminate opposition.30 Gaddafi did 
not stop there. As he noticed that a primary source of opposition lay in the east, he 
punished cities such as Benghazi by cutting off investments, leaving Benghazi in a state
24Pargeter, Alison, Libya: The Rise and Fall of Gaddafi (London: Yale University Press, 2012), 101-102; 
Library of Congress, Libya: A Country Study, ed. Helen Chapin Metz (Federal Research Division Library
of Congress, 1989), 50. 
25Pargeter, Alison, Libya: The Rise and Fall of Gaddafi (London: Yale University Press, 2012), 107-108. 
26Vandewalle, Dirk, A History of Modern Libya (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 108. 
27Pargeter, Alison, Libya: The Rise and Fall of Gaddafi (London: Yale University Press, 2012), 159. 
28Pargeter, Alison, Libya: The Rise and Fall of Gaddafi (London: Yale University Press, 2012), 162.
29Library of Congress, Libya: A Country Study, ed. Helen Chapin Metz (Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress, 1989), 49. 
30Pargeter, Alison, Libya: The Rise and Fall of Gaddafi (London: Yale University Press, 2012), 169; 
Library of Congress, Libya: A Country Study, ed. Helen Chapin Metz (Federal Research Division Library
of Congress, 1989), 50. 
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of utter disrepair.31 Thus, Gaddafi inadvertently created the breeding grounds for his 
final opposition. 
Some reform came to Libya, but to no avail. Gaddafi’s son Saif al-Islam, who 
supported free-markets and modernization, brought about some reform by supporting 
the appointment of foreign oil economist Shukri Ghanem as General Secretaty of the 
General People’s Committee in 2003.32  However, Ghanem’s policies angered many 
Libyans as they viewed his reforms as a threat to tradition and their own livelihoods.33 
Despite some progress, Ghanem was removed from power in 2006, significantly 
slowing economic reform.34 Thus, while the Libyan people endured many supposed 
reforms, they received no real economic progress. This resentment at the lack of 
progress culminated in conflict as war broke out in February of 2011. 
In response to continued oppression and lack of resources, the Libyan people 
began organizing. Fethi Tarbel, an activist and lawyer representing victims of the 
Gaddafi regime was arrested on February 15th, 2011 for his involvement in organizing 
anti-government demonstrations planned for February 17th.35 In addition to Tarbel, 
Libyan forces arrested at least 14 more activists with connections to the planned 
demonstration, triggering a wave of protests.36 Peaceful protests began in Benghazi and 
were met with teargas and physical attacks, resulting in at least one reported death.37 
Thereafter, protests spread to cities including al Bayda, Quba, Ajdabiya, Darnah and 
31Pargeter, Alison, Libya: The Rise and Fall of Gaddafi (London: Yale University Press, 2012), 170-171.
32Vandewalle, Dirk, A History of Modern Libya (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 183. 
33Pargeter, Alison, Libya: The Rise and Fall of Gaddafi (London: Yale University Press, 2012), 194-196.
34Vandewalle, Dirk, A History of Modern Libya (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 191. 
35Vandewalle, Dirk, A History of Modern Libya (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 204; 
Shuaib, Ali, “Libyan Who Sparked Revolution Sworn in as Minister,” Reuters, December 4, 2011.
36Human Rights Watch, “Libya: Arrests, Assaults in Advance of Planned Protests,” Human Rights 
Watch, April 17, 2015.
37Human Rights Watch, “Libya: Arrests, Assaults in Advance of Planned Protests,” Human Rights 
Watch, April 17, 2015, Al Jazeera, “Battle for Libya: Key Moments,” Al Jazeera, April 30 2017.
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Zintan.38 Once more, government forces attacked protestors, firing live rounds and 
reportedly killing at least 12 protestors by February 17th.39 Violence raged on and, by 
February 23rd, the most conservative mortality estimate was 300 dead, a number 
Human Rights Watch acknowledged as conservative and the highest estimate was 1,000
people dead.40 As rebels took hold of cities including Baida, Tobruk, Benghazi, and then
Misrata, conflict showed no signs of slowing.41 In return, on February 22nd, Gaddafi 
vowed to “fight to the last drop of my blood,” clearly indicating that he has no plans to 
appease the opposition and/or relinquish power.42
In light of widespread human rights abuses, Gaddafi’s brutal tactics drew 
criticism from other world leaders. On February 23rd, 2011, President Barack Obama 
condemned violence in Libya, stating "suffering and bloodshed is outrageous, and it is 
unacceptable;” President Nicolas Sarkozy called for sanctions in response to human 
rights violations; and U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon indicated the beginning of 
an investigation into the Libyan regime.43 Thereafter on February 24th, David Cameron 
renewed his February 21st criticism of Gaddafi’s response to protests, calling violence 
38Al Jazeera, “Battle for Libya: Key Moments,” Al Jazeera, April 30 2017;” The Telegraph, “Libyan 
Uprising One-Year Anniversary: Timeline.” Telegraph Media Group, February 17 2012.
39Al Jazeera, “Battle for Libya: Key Moments,” Al Jazeera, April 30 2017;”  Human Rights Watch, 
“Libya: Arrests, Assaults in Advance of Planned Protests,” Human Rights Watch, April 17, 2015; 
Pargeter, Alison, Libya: The Rise and Fall of Gaddafi (London: Yale University Press, 2012), 195. 
40Donadio, Rachel, “Italy Says Death Toll in Libya Is Likely Over 1,000.” The New York Times, February
23, 2011;” Bowen, Jeremy, “Libya: Anti-Gaddafi Protesters 'under Fire' in Tripoli,” BBC News, February 
25, 2011.
41Al Jazeera, “Battle for Libya: Key Moments,” Al Jazeera, April 30 2017;” BBC, “Rebel-Held Areas in 
Libya.” BBC News, March 19, 2011; Chorin, Ethan, Exit the Colonel: The Hidden History of the Libyan 
Revolution (New York: PublicAffairs, 2012), 196.
42Blomfield, Adrian, “Libya: Col Gaddafi Threatens to Unleash Mob Rule,” Telegraph Media Group, 
February 22,  2011; Reuters, “Britain's Cameron Says Libya Violence Unacceptable,” Reuters, February 
22, 2011.
43Wilson, Scott, “Obama Condemns Gaddafi's Crackdown, Sends Clinton for Talks on Libya,” The 
Washington Post, February 24, 2011. 
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unacceptable and urging a stop to the violence.44 As Gaddafi paid no mind to 
international condemnation, world leaders took action. 
On February 26th, international actors began the implementation of sanctions 
against authorities, freezing leader assets, instating an arms embargo, and prohibiting 
travel by Gaddafi and those close to him and the regime.45  Thereafter, on March 5th, 
the National Transitional Council declared itself the sole representative of Libya, 
defying Gaddafi’s call for a halt to the revolution.46 However, violence did not let up. 
As warnings of an assault on Benghazi arose, the UN sprung into action.47 On March 
17th, 2011, the UN Security Council authorized the use of force in protecting Libyan 
citizens with UN Resolution 1973.48 Resolution 1973 expressed significant concern 
about the “deterioration” of the situation in Libya, strongly condemned the Libyan 
state’s use of violence, and authorized the use of “all necessary measures” to protect 
civilians in Libya, including Benghazi.49 
On March 19th, 13 international actors began combat missions, with primary 
operations including the US Operation Odyssey Dawn, Canadian Operation Mobile, 
French Operation Harmattan, and British Operation Ellamy working to enforce 
44The Telegraph, “Libyan Uprising One-Year Anniversary: Timeline,” Telegraph Media Group, February
17 2012. 
45United Nations, Department of Public Information, Security Council imposes sanctions on Libyan 
authorities in bid to stem violent repression, February 26, 2011. 
46The Telegraph, “Libyan Uprising One-Year Anniversary: Timeline,” Telegraph Media Group, February
17 2012.
47United Nations, Department of Public Information, Assault on Benghazi would endanger masses of 
Libyan civilians, Ban warns, March 16, 2011.
48United Nations, Security Council, Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, Authorizing 
‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions, SC/10200, 
March 17, 2011.
49United Nations, Security Council, Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, Authorizing 
‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions, SC/10200, 
March 17, 2011.
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Resolution 1973.50 After initial foreign involvement, NATO assumed control of the 
arms embargo on March 23rd, on March 25th, NATO took control over enforcing the 
no-fly zone and then on March 31st, NATO began “protection of civilians.”51 In total, 
NATO deployed 21 naval crafts, more than 260 air crafts, and approximately 8,000 
troops.52
 
            NATO Frontline, March, 201153
Despite losing ground to state forces in early March, rebels held their positions 
in Misrata and Eastern Libya. On March 18th, there were clashes in Nalut, Zintan, 
Misrata, and Ajdabiya, with rebels holding several cities in the east.54 Beginning on 
March 19th, NATO began attacking state troops with air strikes, forcing state troops to 
50Government of Canada, “Operation MOBILE,” Government of Canada, Last Modified January 22, 
2014.” Gertler, Jeremiah, “Operation Odyssey Dawn (Libya): Background and Issues for Congress,” 
Congressional Research Service, March 30, 2011;” “APPENDIX A.: Timeline of Events in Libya.” In 
Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War. 
51“APPENDIX A.: Timeline of Events in Libya.” In Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan 
Civil War;
 NATO, “Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR Final Mission Stats.,” NATO, November 2, 2011.
52NATO, “Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR Final Mission Stats.,” NATO, November 2, 2011.
53NATO, “Evolution of the frontlines in Libya- March–September 2011.”
54The New York Times, “Map of the Rebellion in Libya, Day by Day,” The New York Times, February 
25, 2011. 
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retreat west, away from Benghazi.55 On March 27th, rebels made significant progress in 
pushing state forces west past Brega but were forced to retreat by the end of the month, 
losing previous progress.56 Following a brief stalemate, state forces pushed conflict 
further east to Ajdabiya and were met with NATO fire on April 9th.57 Rebels took 
control of Ajdabiya by April 10th, with major conflicts occurring in Nalut, Misrata, and 
Brega on April 14th as rebels continued to hold many western cities.58 Conflict 
intensified in the west on April 29th, with rebels holding the majority of Eastern Libya 
and several towns in the west, including Misrata.59 After much conflict, state troops 
withdrew from Misrata on May 15th, and by July 28th, rebels began to encircle Gaddafi
in Tripoli.60 As rebels won over smaller cities, they steadily gained control over the 
majority of the state. By August, 2011, rebels had state troops completely surrounded.61 
55Al Jazeera, “Battle for Libya: Key Moments,” Al Jazeera, April 30 2017.
56The New York Times, “Map of the Rebellion in Libya, Day by Day,” The New York Times, February 
25, 2011. 
57The New York Times, “Map of the Rebellion in Libya, Day by Day,” The New York Times, February 
25, 2011. 
58The New York Times, “Map of the Rebellion in Libya, Day by Day,” The New York Times, February 
25, 2011. 
59The New York Times, “Map of the Rebellion in Libya, Day by Day,” The New York Times, February 
25, 2011. 
60Al Jazeera, “Battle for Libya: Key Moments,” Al Jazeera, April 30 2017.
61 NATO, “Evolution of the frontlines in Libya- March–September 2011.”
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After significant fighting, Tripoli fell to rebel forces in early September.63 On 
October 13th, rebel forces gained control of Gaddafi’s home city, Sirte––with the 
exception of the neighborhood Gaddafi was hiding in.64 Sirte fell on October 20th, 
resulting in the execution of Muammar Gaddafi.65 Libya is declared liberated on 
October 23rd.66 On October 31st, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
made a historic visit to Tripoli and declared “When the United Nations took the historic 
decision to protect you, NATO answered the call. We launched our operation faster 
than ever before... We were effective, flexible and precise.”67 While the intervention 
was initially celebrated, praise turned to condemnation and critics now call the 
intervention a failure––this thesis investigates if they are right. 
62NATO, “Evolution of the frontlines in Libya- March–September 2011.”
63Al Jazeera, “Battle for Libya: Key Moments,” Al Jazeera, April 30 2017.
64Al Jazeera, “Battle for Libya: Key Moments,” Al Jazeera, April 30 2017.
65Al Jazeera, “Battle for Libya: Key Moments,” Al Jazeera, April 30 2017.
66Al Jazeera, “Battle for Libya: Key Moments,” Al Jazeera, April 30 2017.
67NATO,“‘We answered the call- the end of Operation Unified Protector,’” NATO, November 7, 2011.
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III.  Justifications for the Intervention
This section delves into justifications for the intervention presented by 
supporters of the intervention. The case for the intervention primarily hinges on two 
assertions: That Gaddafi’s rhetoric and troop behavior were a humanitarian threat and 
that Operation Unified Protector accomplished its primary goal of protecting human life
and rights. All supporters included support the notion that there was a humanitarian 
threat to the people of Libya. However, only some leverage the counterfactual scenario 
without intervention to argue that a Libya without intervention would have been far 
bloodier and thus the intervention succeeded in its goal of protecting human life and 
human rights. While authors recognize existing turmoil in Libya, many argue that the 
intervention was not designed to build a fully functioning democracy but to prevent 
humanitarian catastrophe. Thus, evidence primarily concerns Gaddafi’s actions, 
violence against civilians, and brief success immediately following Operation Unified 
Protector. 
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Supporters Outline a Major Threat to Benghazi
At a national security council meeting, President Obama was informed of the 
possibility of a military assault on the 700,000 people in Benghazi within the next 48 
hours.68 As supporters of the intervention argue that Operation Unified Protector saved 
thousands of civilian lives in Benghazi, it is critical to investigate if there was in fact a 
humanitarian threat in Libya. Thus, one must determine whether or not Gaddafi’s 
behavior and the actions of his troops indicated an impending threat to Libyan civilians 
in Benghazi and throughout Libya.  
As authors such as Shadi Hamid and Alex Bellamy point out, Muammar 
Gaddafi publicly threatened violence in response to the revolt against him, indicating 
that there was more violence to come.69 On the 22nd of February, 2011, Gaddafi 
addressed the Libyan people, sharply condemning those responsible for inspiring the 
revolt against him. Notably, Gaddafi makes numerous threats including calling upon the
Libyan people to cleanse Libya of “the greasy rats,” and vowing to purify Libya “house 
by house, home by home, alley by alley, person by person.”70 Throughout his speech, 
Gaddafi directs criticism at those responsible for the rebellion, but he does not clarify 
what level of engagement in opposition makes people “rats in their dens.”71 Even more 
sinister, Gaddafi also stated that any Libyan who took up arms against the Libyan 
government would be executed, indicating his view of opposition as a crime punishable 
by death.72 While Gaddafi often speaks of a supposed desire to protect the people of 
68 Power, Samantha, The Education of an Idealist (Dey Street Books, 2019), 297. 
69Bellamy, Alex J.,"Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm," Ethics & 
International Affairs 25, no. 3 (2011); Hamid, Shadi, “Everyone says the Libya intervention was a failure.
They’re wrong,” Brookings Institute, April 12, 2016.
70 Al Jazeera English, “Muammar Gaddafi addresses the nation,” YouTube, February 22, 2011; 
SLOBe,“Muammar Gaddafi speech TRANSLATED (2011 Feb 22),” YouTube, February 23, 2011.
71 Channel 4 News, “Libya: Gaddafi vows ‘I will not leave this land,’” YouTube, February 21, 2011.
72 Miller, Barbara, “Defiant Gaddafi Issues Chilling Threat,” The World Today, February 23, 2011.
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Libya from the harms of rebellion, he also speaks of the necessity of completely 
eliminating the opposition.73 In light of Gaddafi’s history of violence, recent use of 
violence against peaceful protestors, and commitment to maintaining power, the 
dictator’s claim to be with the people falls flat. Additionally, there is no telling what 
actions or words would constitute a punishable offense. As in the case of Fethi Tarbel, 
the activist arrested on February 15th, and protestors in Benghazi, even association with
peaceful protests was met with arrests and deadly force.74 Alex Bellamy encapsulates 
this argument well: "In the face of Qaddafi’s record and his public utterances, however, 
states could not plausibly argue that the threat of mass atrocities was not real."75 Thus, 
the case for the intervention begins with Gaddafi himself as both his authorization of 
and advocacy for the use of lethal force in quelling uprisings is arguably indicative of a 
pattern of violence that would have continued had NATO not intervened to protect 
civilians. 
Similarly, subsequent statements by Gaddafi serve as indictments of his sinister 
intentions for Benghazi. In a March 17th radio address, Gaddafi warned that “we will 
clean Benghazi, all of Benghazi….”76 This threat was particularly salient as protests 
began in Benghazi and the self-declared people’s government, the Libyan National 
Council, maintained headquarters in the city.77 Admittedly, Gaddafi ordered troops not 
to hurt those who surrendered and fled, but this statement sharply contrasts his 
73Miller, Barbara, “Defiant Gaddafi Issues Chilling Threat,” The World Today, February 23, 2011.
74Vandewalle, Dirk, A History of Modern Libya (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 204; 
Shuaib, Ali, “Libyan Who Sparked Revolution Sworn in as Minister,” Reuters, December 4, 2011.
75Bellamy, Alex J.,"Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm," Ethics & 
International Affairs 25, no. 3 (2011).
76Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Libyans Brace for Gaddafi Offensive in Rebel Stronghold of Benghazi,” The 
Washington Post, March 17, 2011.
77Brown, L. Carl, and Nevill Barbour, “Emergence of the Transitional National Council in Benghazi,” 
Encyclopædia Britannica, March 5, 2020. 
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statement that “We will show no mercy to collaborators” as well as his orders for the 
use of force against peaceful protestors.78 Therefore, Gaddafi’s own words and actions 
triggered the movement to counter him with military force. 
78Heneghan, Tom, “UPDATE 1-Gaddafi Tells Benghazi His Army Is Coming Tonight,” Reuters, March 
17, 2011. 
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Conflict Was Inevitable––NATO Simply Minimized Harm 
In contrast with Gaddafi’s invitation to end conflict, rebels showed no sign of 
giving in. Thus, conflict between the state and rebels was inevitable and the 
international community ultimately chose to defend both those at risk of violence and 
those fighting for autonomy.79 Had the international community not intervened, then 
Muammar Gaddafi would have been free to crush the opposition, an option that would 
have allowed for further deaths and denied Libyans the freedoms they demanded. This 
situation was made even more dire by the widespread nature of opposition. While past 
acts of rebellion had been limited to small factions of the Libyan population, within the 
first ten days of conflict, rebellions had occurred in as many as ten cities. Thus, unlike 
past oppositions, this rebellion would have required state crackdown on cities 
throughout Libya. Therefore, NATO rightfully chose to minimize harm in an inevitable 
conflict.  
Rebel and civilian behavior in February and March illustrated that Libyans 
would no longer tolerate Gaddafi’s totalitarian regime, making conflict inevitable. On 
February 19th, a citizen of Benghazi reportedly said “It is too late for dialogue now,” in 
response to the government use of force against protestors.80 In response to Gaddfi’s 
February 22nd televised speech, protestors reportedly threw shoes at his image, despite 
the leader’s stated goal of eliminating the supposed enemy of the people, the 
opposition.81 Therefore, even if Gaddafi was earnest in his appeals to unifying Libya, 
79Samantha Power briefly alludes to this argument in The Education of an Idealist but this section is my 
own analysis. 
80The New York Times, “Map of the Rebellion in Libya, Day by Day,” The New York Times, February 
25, 2011. 
81Black, Ian, “Gaddafi Urges Violent Showdown and Tells Libya 'I'll Die a Martyr,'” The Guardian, 
February 22, 2011; Channel 4 News,“Libya: Gaddafi vows ‘I will not leave this land,’” YouTube, 
February 21, 2011. 
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the rebel response indicates that they had no intention of submitting to the dictator. 
Similarly, in response to Gaddafi’s March 17th address, protestors were seen flying the 
pre-Gaddafi Libyan flag in acts of defiance in Benghazi, casting extreme doubt on the 
case for a peaceful unification under Gaddafi’s leadership.82 Even more telling, from the
outbreak of violence in mid-February until the end of the conflict in October, rebel 
forces continued to resist militarily, despite both threats and peace offerings by Gaddafi.
For instance, in April of 2011, the African Union attempted to form a peace plan 
between the Gaddafi regime and rebel leaders.83 Whereas Gaddafi is reported to have 
accepted the terms of the peace plan, rebels rejected the plan on the grounds that the 
plan did not mandate that Gaddafi and his sons exit Libyan politics.84 This refusal 
reveals that rebels viewed the conflict as a zero-sum game, it was them or Gaddafi. 
While some may argue that there was no threat to Benghazi as Gaddafi was open to 
peace, the rebel refusal to compromise over his departure indicates that conflict was 
looming on the horizon as both sides sought to eliminate the other. 
Even if Gaddafi was the merciful ruler he claimed to be, it would not have been 
enough. Rebels showed no signs of a desire to compromise and openly challenged the 
state. Thus, rebel refusal to back down would likely have led to try-or-die battles in 
which rebel fighters truly had nothing to lose and thus fought accordingly.85 In this 
scenario, Gaddafi would then have to make good on his promise to eliminate opposition
and would thus meet challenge with force, prolonging and intensifying conflict. As 
stated previously, Gaddafi vowed to eliminate collaborators to the resistance, thus those 
82Heneghan, Tom, “UPDATE 1-Gaddafi Tells Benghazi His Army Is Coming Tonight,” Reuters, March 
17, 2011.
83Al Jazeera, “Libyan Rebels Reject African Union Peace Plan,” Al Jazeera, April 11, 2011.
84Al Jazeera, “Libyan Rebels Reject African Union Peace Plan,” Al Jazeera, April 11, 2011.
85Samantha Power briefly mentions this concept in her book The Education of an Idealist. 
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close to the rebels, or even merely perceived as close to the rebels, would be subject th 
Gaddafi’s wrath as well. Thereby, conflict would endanger not only rebels seeking 
freedom but those accused of being too close with the resistance, worsening an already 
bloody conflict.
In a conflict between an unyielding dictator and those rebelling against state 
violence, the international community chose to protect the people. In light of the violent
crackdown on peaceful protests and thus use of violence against civilians in conflict, to 
side with Gaddafi would have been to support violent suppression and to abstain from 
intervention would fail to uphold humanitarian doctrines such as the Responsibility to 
Protect. Thus, intervening to protect human life and human rights was the option both 
legally in alignment with humanitarian law and ethically in alignment with respect to 
human life and dignity. 
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Libyan State Violence as Justification for Intervention 
Whereas 2011 was not the first time Gaddafi utilized violence to quell rebellion, 
the uprising was unprecedentedly widespread and thus threatened extreme violence. 
Supporters of the Operation Unified Protector argue that violence prior to the 
intervention was severe enough to warrant intervention and that, had NATO not 
intervened, the results would have been catastrophic for Libyan civilians.  
Violence in Libya began on February 15th, 2011 and quickly spread to cities 
throughout the state. Peaceful civilian protests began in Benghazi on February 15th in 
response to the arrest of a human rights activist and were met with teargas and physical 
attacks, resulting in “a number” of deaths.86 Thereafter, protests spread to cities 
including al Bayda, Quba, Ajdabiya, Darnah and Zintan and many resulted in violent 
conflict, with more than a dozen casualties.87 By February 23rd, the most conservative 
mortality estimate was 300 dead across Libya, a number Human Rights Watch 
acknowledged as conservative and the highest estimate was 1,000 people dead.88 In 
response to the increasing violence, the international community began to put pressure 
on the Libyan government. 
Despite international pressure, Gaddafi did not cease violence. The UN adopted 
Resolution 1970 on February 26th, urging the Libyan government to cease violent 
action against protestors.89 The resolution also instated an arms embargo, travel ban, and
86Al Jazeera, “Battle for Libya: Key Moments,” Al Jazeera, April 30 2017.
87Al Jazeera, “Battle for Libya: Key Moments,” Al Jazeera, April 30 2017; The Telegraph, “Libyan 
Uprising One-Year Anniversary: Timeline,” Telegraph Media Group, February 17 2012.
88Donadio, Rachel, “Italy Says Death Toll in Libya Is Likely Over 1,000,” The New York Times, February
23, 2011; Bowen, Jeremy, “Libya: Anti-Gaddafi Protesters 'under Fire' in Tripoli,” BBC News, February 
25, 2011.
89United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011), Imposes an arms embargo, a travel ban and 
an assets freeze in connection with the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, S/RES/1970 (26 
February 2011).
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asset freeze on those close to the Libyan regime.90 In a further attempt to discourage 
violence, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon personally called Gaddafi on February 
21st to implore him to cease attacks, to no avail.91 
Conflict raged on, including reported violence against civilians. The UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, reported that Libyan forces were 
blocking ambulances, allowing the injured to die as troops sealed off neighborhoods.92 
Reports of violence in Zawiya, a coastal town to the west of Tripoli, told of a “partially 
destroyed ghost town,” in which government forces targeted doctors, medics, and 
vulnerable civilians, an affront tantamount to a “wholesale killing of civilians” as state 
forces indiscriminately fired on noncombatants.93 As the stated goal of the intervention 
was to protect human life and human rights, analyses of violence leading up to the 
intervention is important to establishing whether or not the intervention was truly 
justified. 
Supporters emphasize initial violence as evidence of the necessity of 
intervention while critics either minimize or do not address initial violence. Authors 
argue that, given the fact that even peaceful protests were met with deadly force, it was 
clear that continued rebellion would be met with violence.94 In addition, as protests 
began in Benghazi and as rebels maintained strongholds in the city, Benghazi was by all
90United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011), Imposes an arms embargo, a travel ban and 
an assets freeze in connection with the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, S/RES/1970 (26 
February 2011).
91United Nations, Department of Public Information, Ban strongly condemns Qadhafi’s actions against 
protesters, calls for punishment, February 23, 2011.
92Specific neighborhoods are not identified. Power, Samantha, The Education of an Idealist (Dey Street 
Books, 2019), 294. 
93Power, Samantha, The Education of an Idealist (Dey Street Books, 2019), 300. 
94Bellamy, Alex J.,"Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm," Ethics & 
International Affairs 25, no. 3 (2011); Hamid, Shadi, “Everyone says the Libya intervention was a failure.
They’re wrong,” Brookings Institute, April 12, 2016.
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then accounts, a target of the Libyan government. Therefore, supporters argue that, not 
only did initial violence result in human rights abuses and death, initial conflict was 
indicative of further harm to come to Libyan civilians. 
Under Gaddafi’s orders, Libyan troops moved across the state, leaving carnage 
in their wake. If Gaddafi’s forces were harming civilians in initial battles, then one can 
presumably make the case that treatment of those in Benghazi would be equally as 
violent, if not worse. Benghazi was the headquarters of the rebel government and the 
site of the revolution’s beginning after the arrest of Fethi Tarbel. Thus, it is highly 
possible that the city would have faced a severe punishment for its primary role in 
challenging Gaddafi. As supporters of Operation Unified Protector frequently cite a 
threat to Benghazi in support of the intervention, establishing a pattern of violence will 
provide the foundation for a claim about the threat to Benghazi. 
                      February 20th, 201195
Using both firsthand and secondhand reports of violence, particularly violence 
against civilians, one can conclude that there was indeed a risk posed to human life and 
95The New York Times, “Map of the Rebellion in Libya, Day by Day,” The New York Times, February 
25, 2011. 
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rights during conflicts in Libya. While reports were sporadic and noncomprehensive, it 
is apparent that violence was indiscriminate and showed no sign of slowing.96  
 The first major clash occurred in Benghazi, with rebels taking hold of the city 
on February 20th.97 During February 17th and 18th, reports of paid mercenaries 
harming civilians were rampant.98 In one instance, soldiers are reported to have opened 
fire on a funeral procession as it passed a military compound.99 One surgeon at the 
Benghazi Medical Center reported that they saw more than 2,000 patients from 
February 17th to 20th and that nearly 20% of admitted patients died.100 Another doctor 
reported seeing an eight year old boy die from a gunshot wound to the head, adding that
all casualties he witnessed were young civilians.101 Upon taking control of the Katiba, a 
state military compound, rebels declared victory in taking control of Benghazi. 
However, the government had done its damage. 
Death counts are unclear, a problem exacerbated by the government shutdown 
of the internet.102 Human Rights Watch reported that government forces killed 84 
people, 35 of whom died in Benghazi, in three days of combat and rebels reported more 
than 100 deaths in six days of violence.103 Despite different numbers and time periods, it
is clear that government violence resulted in numerous casualties, including civilian 
96Appendix A compiles reported death statistics. 
97Al Jazeera, “Battle for Libya: Key Moments,” Al Jazeera, April 30 2017.
98Chorin, Ethan, Exit the Colonel: The Hidden History of the Libyan Revolution (2012), 195. 
99Chorin , Ethan, Exit the Colonel: The Hidden History of the Libyan Revolution (2012), 195.
100Al Jazeera, “'Many Killed' in Libya's Benghazi;” Chorin , Ethan, Exit the Colonel: The Hidden History
of the Libyan Revolution, 195.
101Al Jazeera, “'Many Killed' in Libya's Benghazi;” Chorin , Ethan, Exit the Colonel: The Hidden History
of the Libyan Revolution, 195.
102Al Jazeera, “'Many Killed' in Libya's Benghazi,” Al Jazeera, February 20, 2011.
103Human Rights Watch reported deaths spanning from February 17th to 19th across several cities and 
rebels reported. Rebel reports of fatalities were published on February 19th and thus the six days referred 
to were presumably February 14th to 19th. Therefore, these two figures could potentially overlap in 
counting those killed. Al Jazeera, “'Many Killed' in Libya's Benghazi,” Al Jazeera, February 20, 2011; 
Human Rights Watch, “Libya: Security Forces Kill 84 Over Three Days,” Human Rights Watch, 
February 18, 2011.
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deaths. Thus, initial clashes in Benghazi were very telling of what was to come. 
Military targeting of civilians undermines Gaddafi’s claim that he would only pursue 
action against active rebels, an appeal made even more uncertain by Gaddafi’s defiance 
in the face of international condemnation. 
                          March 19th, 2011104
Violence also wracked Misrata as rebels fought the state for control of the city. 
When snipers arrived in the city on March 19th, they were reported to have fired at both
rebels and civilians as well as launching missiles into non-combatant areas.105 Rebels 
claimed that they found grafiti in a sniper’s den reading “We will not forgive anybody 
from Misrata. We will fuck your daughters and your wives,” indicating that government
forces would not be merciful in the event of victory.106 While unverifiable due to a 
prohibition on foreign journalism, by March 23rd, rebels reported 16 people killed by 
snipers and reported that state troops were preventing rebels from entering a hospital to 
treat the wounded.107 On April 11th, 2011 UNICEF reported the deaths of 20 children, 
104The New York Times, “Map of the Rebellion in Libya, Day by Day,” The New York Times, February 
25, 2011. 
105Rice, Xan, “Misrata Rebels Strike Back Against Gaddafi Snipers,” April 22, 2011. 
106Rice, Xan, “Misrata Rebels Strike Back Against Gaddafi Snipers,” April 22, 2011. 
107Ahmed, Hamid Ould, “Rebels Say 16 Dead in Misrata, Hospital Attacked.” March 23, 2011.
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one as young as nine months old, and urged a stop to the siege of Misrata.108 The 
Guardian reported that, on the same day, soldiers opened fire on a family seeking 
refuge, killing a four year old boy and two older relatives.109 On April 20th, Human 
Rights Watch confirmed the deaths of photographer and film-maker Tim Hetherington 
and photojournalist Chris Hondros, both killed by a mortar round while covering the 
battle.110 Thereafter, in May, a BBC article included reports that troops sexually 
assaulted women, killed civilians, and released cluster bombs indiscriminately.111 In the 
same month, Misratan doctors reported 1,000 dead and civilians reported surviving with
scarce sustenance, little electricity, and dwindling medical supplies.112 By May 15th, 
government troops left Misrata, leaving carnage in their wake. As violence continued 
into the summer, the situation did not improve for civilians.  
Once more, reports of violence against civilians are damning for the Gaddafi 
regime.113 In June 2011, the World Health Organization reported 630 deaths in Misrata 
and 600 more people were wounded.114 In a 2014 report, the UN determined that the 
state had used weapons indiscriminately, with shelling persisting until August 2011; 
targeted the only means of civilian escape, the port; and attacked medical personnel and 
facilities.115 Despite international outrage and intervention, government troops attacked 
108United Nations Children’s Fund, “UNICEF Calls for an Immediate End to the Siege of Misrata,” April 
11, 2011. 
109Sherwood, Harriet. “Libya Unrest: Thousands of Children Caught in the Crossfire in Misrata.” April 
11, 2011. 
110Human Rights Watch,“Libya: Journalists Killed in Misrata,” Human Rights Watch, April 20, 2011
111Lewis, Aidan. “Misrata: Libya's City Under Siege.” BBC News, May 10, 2011. 
112Taylor, Alan, “Three Months of Civil War in Libya,” The Atlantic, May 25, 2011; Al Jazeera, “Battle 
for Libya: Key Moments,” Al Jazeera, April 30 2017.     
113Reports are compiled in Appendix A. 
114World Health Organization, “Libya crisis: August 2011 Update,” World Health Organization, August, 
2011. 
115United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the International Commission of
Inquiry on Libya, A/HRC/19/68 (January 28 2014), 14-15. 
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the city for nearly three months, killing civilians and placing thousands more in danger. 
While Gaddafi may have claimed to be a merciful leader, body counts and wreckage say
otherwise. Therefore, as Daadler, Stravis, and Hamid argue, there is little evidence to 
suggest that Gaddafi would not have been extremely violent in his treatment of civilians
in upcoming conflicts and thus preventing further violence was necessary.116
                          February 20th, 2011117
Conflict persisted in Tripoli as well. By February 20th, forces cracked down on 
dissidents, with reports of rounds fired at those collecting bodies and the use of tear gas 
and live ammunition on mosque-goers after prayer.118 This is a particularly alarming 
occurrence as Gaddafi was a fervent supporter of religion, but set aside religious beliefs 
to maintain power over the state. Thus, across Libya, the number of civilian fatalities 
and human rights abuses illustrates a clear threat to human life and human rights. 
116Daadler, Ivo and Stavridis, James, “NATO’s Success in Libya,” New York Times, October 30, 2011; 
Hamid, Shadi, “Everyone says the Libya intervention was a failure. They’re wrong,” Brookings Institute, 
April 12, 2016.
117The New York Times, “Map of the Rebellion in Libya, Day by Day,” The New York Times, February 
25, 2011. 
118Chorin, Ethan, Exit the Colonel: The Hidden History of the Libyan Revolution (New York: 
PublicAffairs, 2012), 199.
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UN Investigation Further Reveals State Violence
A 2014 UN report on violence throughout Libya sheds further light on the 
situation on the ground, revealing numerous human rights abuses and killings by state 
forces.119 The UN investigation determined that between February 20th and 21st, more 
than 200 people died in Tripoli.120 In August, the UN confirmed that state troops had 
thrown grenades and fired arms into prisoner quarters, killing 106 of 157 people, by 
using the testimony of former prisoners, confessions by Gaddafi soldiers, and the 
identification of human remains.121 The investigation also found that troops shot three 
doctors and three prisoners before Tripoli fell to rebels in August.122 Reports from this 
detention center in Yarmouk, Tripoli also included the routine use of torture against 
prisoners.123 In another detention center, former prisoners testified that guards shot at 
prisoners as the city fell on August 23rd, killing 21 detainees.124 The same UN report 
confirmed that Gaddafi’s troops would attack medical personnel attempting to treat 
wounded rebels and would launch attacks on medical facilities.125 Additional evidence 
of the Gaddafi regime’s brutality included the arbitrary arrests of people in Tripoli and 
forced disappearances.126
119Neither supporters nor critics reference this report, in part because many pieces were written before its 
publication. However, the report provides one of the most comprehensive accounts of the conflict in 
Libya to date. 
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Additional conflicts raged across the state. In Bani Walid, the UN reported mass
executions perpetrated by Gaddafi’s forces.127 Beginning on February 23rd in Zawiya, 
government troops shot at unarmed protestors, killing seven people.128 The UN also 
confirmed arbitrary arrests, forced disappearances, and attacks on medical personnel 
and medical facilities in Zawiya.129 While many prisoners were rebels, reports found 
that government forces also arrested rebel family members and peaceful demonstrators, 
holding many without access to legal aid such as an attorney.130 On June 6th, 2011 in Al
Khums, 18 people died from being held in metal containers with poor ventilation by 
Gaddafi’s troops, UN researchers confirmed the deaths with interviews and by 
observing remains.131 In Al Qalaa during the month of July, the UN identified the 
remains of 34 men and boys who had been killed while blindfolded with their hands 
behind their backs at a former boy’s camp.132 Additional reports referenced the torture 
of prisoners formerly held at the camp.133 In Bab al Azizia, the UN used photographs of 
human remains to confirm the deaths of 15 men in civilian clothing.134 Reports of 
torture were widespread, with many confirmed cases, some including the sexual assault 
127United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, 
A/HRC/19/68 (January 28 2014), 8. 
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of both male and female prisoners by government forces.135 Government forces also 
raped women in their homes and abducted and then raped others.136 While some rapes 
were committed without apparent reason, many were in an apparent attempt to scare 
revolutionaries.137 In Zintan, the UN confirmed the deaths of 55 civilians, including 
women and children by the end of the conflict.138 
In sum, the UN report concluded that the Gaddafi regime had perpetrated crimes
against humanity and war crimes throughout the state.139 Notably, the UN also 
confirmed the interim government’s commitment to human rights and its actions to 
improve fact-finding and justice processes, with some reservations about the unequal 
enforcement of the law as victorious rebels were not always held accountable for acts of
retribution against government loyalists.140 While the rebels were not wholly innocent 
actors, NATO ultimately sought to protect human life and rights, which primarily meant
preventing state troops from advancing. Therefore, this UN report solidifies evidence to 
support the notion that NATO did in fact “side” with the rebels against widespread state
violence.  
The human rights abuses and murders perpetrated by Gaddafi’s troops indicate 
that state troops were on a warpath. The pervasive civilian deaths and human rights 
abuses indicate that Gaddafi was not keeping his word to protect civilians and would 
135United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, 
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harm those even suspected of treason. As some reports of violence were not linked to a 
clear motive, it becomes increasingly clear that troops exercised little restraint in using 
violence against civilians. Thus, the pattern of systemic violence and death indicates 
that there was cause for concern that, had Gaddafi reached Benghazi, then a bloodbath 
would have ensued. However, even if Gaddafi was not on his way to Benghazi, then 
there would still be cause for intervention. As neither international condemnation nor 
military intervention stopped Gaddafi on the warpath, it is clear that the dictator viewed 
the conflict as a zero-sum game––rebels needed to be eliminated. Therefore, without 
intervention, Gaddafi would have been free to exterminate all opposition, likely 
resulting in even more brutal repression and retaliatory violence against suspected 
traitors. Thus, intervention served as the sole defense against the dictator and was 
necessary to protect all cities, including Benghazi.  
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Some Supporters Claim Intervention Accomplished its Primary Goal
Some supporters of the intervention applaud its success in achieving its limited 
goal of protecting human life and human rights.141 Authors argue that, even if the 
intervention did not lead to total success, NATO was not in Libya to build a fully 
functioning state, and thus cannot have been expected to construct a full-fledged 
democracy.142 Thus, supporters seek to judge Operation Unified Protector based on a 
narrower scope and ultimately find that the intervention was successful in its specific 
goal of protecting people and their rights. 
Several authors voice their support for the intervention’s success in its narrow 
goal. Shadi Hammid of the Brookings Institute argues that the goal of the intervention 
was not to establish a full democracy but to stop a “massacre;” Stewart Patrick states 
that the intervention was an “unambiguous” case for the Responsibility to Protect 
Doctrine; and Alex Bellamy argues that the threat of mass atrocity was clear.143 
President Barack Obama himself spoke to the operation’s humanitarian success, stating 
in an interview that "We averted large-scale civilian casualties, we prevented what 
almost surely would have been a prolonged and bloody civil conflict."144 Thus, based on
Gaddafi’s immediate use of violence, the unprecedentedly widespread protests, and the 
zero-sum mindset of both sides, intervention was necessary to prevent increasingly 
brutal battles.  One may argue that the scope of the intervention should have been wider
141Daadler, Ivo and Stavridis, James, “NATO’s Success in Libya,” New York Times, October 30, 2011; 
Hamid, Shadi, “Everyone says the Libya intervention was a failure. They’re wrong,” Brookings Institute, 
April 12, 2016.
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so as to include assistance in rebuilding the state. However there was a major barrier to 
state-building: rebels flatly refused military oversight.145 While the United Nations 
Support Mission in Libya, created in September of 2011, allowed for some international
oversight, the international community was extremely limited in its options for 
rebuilding Libya.146 Therefore, while it is fair to argue that the intervention would have 
ideally included rebuilding Libya, doing so was ultimately infeasible. 
Supporters of the intervention also argue that NATO cannot be held accountable
for fallout, including the current civil war, that occurred years after the intervention. 
Shadi Hamid argues that the current civil war began in 2014, three years after 
intervention.147 Thus, the significant number of variables affecting the state over the 
three year gap are too confounding to prove a convincing link from the NATO 
intervention to a war that began three years later. In fact, one study by RAND found 
that many rebel militias were peaceful after the intervention and some even offered to 
disarm, that there were low levels of damage to the state, that there was not a significant
terrorist presence in the state after conflict, and that oil production survived 
immediately after the intervention––all factors that point to the intervention as non-
detrimental to Libya.148 Furthermore, in 2012, Libya held its first free and fair elections, 
a milestone in the state’s history, indicating some progress.149 Brian McQuinn and 
Nicholas Kristoff corroborate the fact that militias were largely nonviolent, and, 
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according to McQuinn, many militias established treaties during the conflict.150 Kristoff 
adds that the Libyan people were actively grateful to NATO and that it is in full 
alignment with historical precedent that new regimes face transition difficulties, and 
thus governmental strife is not unique to Libya and has been exacerbated by rebel 
refusal of aid, not by NATO’s intervention.151
150McQuinn, Brian, “Assessing (In)Security after the Arab Spring: The Case of Libya,” PS: Political 
Science & Politics 46, no. 4 (2013): 2; Kristof, Nicholas, “'Thank You, America!'” The New York Times, 
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Summary
The case for Operation Unified Protector argues that the intervention set out to 
protect human rights and human lives and that it accomplished just that. As the violence
inflicted by the Gaddafi regime before and during the intervention is clear and his 
rhetoric was often quite violent, it is difficult to argue that Gaddafi would not use 
extreme violence to crush dissent. However, it is also troubling that rebels have engaged
in violence in Libya as well. Thus it is a question of whether or not Libyan civilians 
would have been safer without intervention. This also involves asking whether or not 
the violence perpetrated by rebels is a reflection of the intervention as a whole.   
37
IV. Critics Say Intervention Both Unnecessary and Harmful  
Critics of the intervention argue both that the intervention was unnecessary and 
that Operation Unified Protector ultimately did more harm than good for the Libyan 
people. Authors argue that state violence was exaggerated and thus intervention was 
unnecessary and actually worsened the humanitarian situation in Libya.152 Critics place 
responsibility for increased violence in Libya both during and after the intervention on 
NATO, arguing that a Libya without intervention would not be as destabilized as it is 
today.153 Additional criticisms include the loss of weapons in Libya, increased terrorist 
activity in Libya and surrounding states, and a fractured without a fully functioning 
government.  
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Critics Say No Major Threat to Benghazi
Critics of the intervention reject the notion that Benghazi was at risk of a 
massacre, thus arguing that the intervention was wholly unnecessary.154 Alan Kuperman
argues that Gaddafi’s rhetoric was not indicative of bloodlust as, during his March 17th 
speech, Gaddafi promised to protect civilians and leave an exit for rebels fleeing 
Benghazi, thus indicating that he was not going to massacre civilians.155 It is true that 
Gaddafi stated “they can go to Egypt or wherever they want to go,” and that “those who
surrender their weapons… we will forgive them and we will have amnesty for those 
who surrender their weapons… anyone who throws his arms away and stays at home 
will be protected.”156 In the midst of a speech about cleansing Libya, Gaddafi does 
appear to offer a way out for the people of Benghazi who abandon their weapons and 
potentially indicates that an advancement across the state toward Benghazi would pose 
no risk to noncombatants. Kuperman also argues that warnings of genocide were 
manufactured by Libyan expatriots in Switzerland in an attempt to invoke the 
Responsibility to Protect.157 However, Kuperman’s source is unclear and likely did not 
vastly influence world leaders as various leaders individually condemned government 
violence without mentioning a threat of genocide.158
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Kuperman argues that, in the first seven weeks of battle in Misrata, of the 
400,000 residents, only 257 killed, and that only 30 of the wounded were women or 
children, indicating that violence was not as extreme as perceived.159 Human Rights 
Watch confirms that the population of Misrata in 2011 was more than 300,000 people 
and that one doctor reported that 22 women and 8 children had been injured.160 
Similarly, Kuperman cites Hugh Roberts’s analysis of the Libya intervention to prove 
that there was no threat to Benghazi.161 However, Roberts merely states that reports of 
initial violence were untrue, without deeper analysis of body counts and/or additional 
warning signs.162 Kuperman also claims that, as the state had recaptured all but one 
major city between March 5th and March 15th and had not engaged in retaliatory 
violence, then there was proof that a bloodbath would not ensue.163 While there were no 
reports of retaliatory killing during these dates, rebels were still in control of several 
states in Eastern Libya as well as Benghazi, indicating that there were still battles to 
come.164 Kuperman’s claim also does not account for people who had died in battling 
for control over Libyan cities, thus the absence of retaliatory violence did not mean a 
complete absence of violence. Benjamin Friedman echoes this sentiment, stating that, 
while the regime perpetrated some war crimes, it did not engage in a wholesale 
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slaughter of civilians and thus there was not a significant threat to Benghazi.165 Thus, 
critics of the intervention make the case that, as the government engaged in 
proportionally little violence, there was no meaningful threat to Benghazi and thus 
intervention was unwarranted. 
Critics argue that this evidence disproves an eminent threat to Benghazi; 
however, even if true, this may miss the potential for conflicts in other Libyan cities. 
While some supporters include Benghazi as a critical factor, authors such as Shadi 
Hamid argue that the intervention was done to protect human rights and human life as a 
whole, not just in Benghazi. It is also important to keep in mind the text of Resolution 
1973 that orders respondents “to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding 
paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas 
under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi…”166 As the 
resolution did not specify human rights in Benghazi only and instead ordered the 
protection of human rights as a whole, in addition to expressing general alarm at 
violence perpetrated by the Gaddafi regime, this intervention cannot be labeled as 
unnecessary protection for Benghazi as the goal of the intervention was much broader.  
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Critics Argue Intervention Increased Deaths and Violence
In addition to arguing that the intervention was unwarranted due to the limited 
threat to Benghazi, critics also argue that intervention increased fatalities and violence. 
Authors argue that due to the extended, intensified nature of conflict as well as the 
resulting fallout, the NATO intervention in Libya multiplied human rights violations 
and increased death tolls. Critics also pose their own counterfactual scenario in which 
they allege that Gaddafi’s troops would have quickly regained power, resulting in fewer
casualties than seen with the intervention. 
Alan Kuperman argues that, had NATO not intervened, then the conflict would 
have been over in six weeks rather than eight months.167 According to the New York 
Times map of troop movements, it is true that some rebel forces were retreating.168 
However, conflict raged on in Western Libya.169 Thus, it may be true that part of the 
conflict would have died out after six weeks, it is questionable whether or not the 
rebellion as a whole would have ended.
 
167Kuperman, Alan, “Lessons from Libya: How Not to Intervene,” Belfer Center for Science and 
International Affairs, September, 2013.
168The New York Times, “Map of the Rebellion in Libya, Day by Day,” The New York Times, February 
25, 2011. 
169The New York Times, “Map of the Rebellion in Libya, Day by Day,” The New York Times, February 
25, 2011. 
42
March 16th, 2011170
Extending this argument, Kuperman argues that, due to the prolonged nature of 
conflict, the death toll increased as many as ten times what it would have been if NATO
had not gotten involved.171 As death counts vary from the hundreds to the tens of 
thousands, it is almost impossible to prove this claim. In March 2011, one Human 
Rights Watch member said that the only number he could confirm was between 420 and
430  people dead from 16th to the 25th of February.172 A 2011 UN report issued on 
February 25th, estimated that more than 1,000 people had been killed in conflict.173 On 
February 22nd, 2011, another non-governmental organization, the International 
Coalition Against War Criminals, estimated that 519 people had died by the end of 
February.174 Thus as these estimates encompass at most half of the time before NATO 
intervened, then it can be assumed that death tolls before Operation Unified Protector 
were higher than any existing estimate of fatalities. Additionally, as seen in initial 
conflicts, government troops attacked civilians in several cities before the intervention 
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began. Thus, it is likely that this pattern would have continued and thereby death tolls 
would not have plateaued as Kuperman assumes. If anything, deaths would likely have 
increased without intervention as there would not have been any entity preventing 
Gaddafi from completely eliminating dissent.  
Calculating known deaths is extremely difficult, making it equally difficult to 
prove Kuperman’s claim that the intervention multiplied deaths by a factor of ten. 
Kuperman cites three different estimates of the total number of fatalities by October 
2011. First, 8,000 deaths estimated by a US official in a private meeting; then, 9,400 
total deaths assuming the same number of rebels and state troops died; and, 11,500 total
deaths, assuming both sides saw an equal number of deaths and assuming missing 
people are dead.175 Contrastingly, Rod Nordland of the New York Times reports that the
number of people in morgues was in the hundreds on both the rebel and state side.176 
Not only are these figures extremely different, high-end death counts are also contested,
further complicating the ability to determine how many fatalities occurred. 
Rod Nordland of the New York Times argued that high-end death counts were 
based on the assumption that most prisoners died; however, the total number of 
prisoners in Libya was unknown and it is unknown how many died.177 While this may 
cast doubt on high-end death counts, it is insufficient to dismiss high numbers, given the
lack of information. With final death estimates ranging from “hundreds” in morgues to 
11,500, it is nearly impossible to establish an official tally without literally counting 
bodies. Thus, Kuperman’s claim that intervention drastically increased mortalities is not
175Kuperman, Alan, “Obama's Libya Debacle: How a Well-Meaning Intervention Ended in Failure,” 
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provable and thus cannot be heavily weighted against the intervention without making 
significant assumptions about how many people would have died under Gaddafi.   
An additional claim argues that rebels purposely engaged in violent conflict. 
Kuperman argues that rebels engaged in violence as a means of winning support from 
the international community.178 While this argument explains one plausible motive for 
engaging in conflict, Kuperman does not offer evidence of an increase in violence 
linked to pleas for international intervention and thus this argument carries little weight.
Authors also argue that NATO indiscriminately killed and harmed civilians 
during the intervention, building a case about the intervention as harmful to the people 
themselves. Alan Kuperman and Ted Carpenter argue that NATO attacked civilians 
indiscriminately with airstrikes, pointing to the intervention’s harms.179 A 2014 Human 
Rights Watch report confirmed that NATO airstrikes killed at least 72 civilians.180 
Critics also argue that the intervention increased human rights abuses and deaths
in Libya and thus civilians would have fared better without the intervention. Kuperman 
generally states that intervention led to increased human rights abuses whereas 
Friedman claims in a 2016 article that, had NATO not intervened, then the death toll of 
conflict in Libya would have been  the number of casualties in the Syrian Civil ⅕ the number of casualties in the Syrian Civil 
War.181 These claims are not measurable as there is no agreed upon total death count or 
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number of human rights abuses for the conflict in Libya. Thus, one cannot draw 
conclusions about numbers that are unknown themselves. It is also unreasonable to 
weigh Friedman’s argument in particular. This is because it is unfair to compare the 
eight months of conflict in Libya to the Syrian Civil War which had been raging for five
years when Friedman made his claim. Thus, blanket claims about increases in violence 
or death cannot be weighed heavily as the numbers are unknown.
In addition to criticisms of violence that occurred during the conflict, several 
critics use violence in Libya that occurred from 2012 to as late as 2017 as proof that the 
intervention was detrimental to Libya. While later violence is not negligible, it is 
disconnected from the intervention due to the significant lapse in time and other 
confounding variables such as a new regime. 
Alan Kuperman and Ted Carpenter both cite violence in Libya after the 
intervention as evidence that the operation led to an increase in death and violence. 
Kuperman describes the deaths of 40 women and 9 children from January to August 
2014 in Tripoli and the use of a rocket in an attack on a hospital in September 2014 as 
evidence of a fragmented state.182 While there has not been verification of the 49 deaths,
the UN included the figure in a 2014 report, granting the claim some legitimacy.183 In 
addition, while Amnesty International reports attacks on hospitals in October and 
December of 2014, there are no reports of a rocket attack on a hospital in September of 
2014.184 Kuperman also cites the 93 attacks on Libyan journalists in 2014 as evidence of
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a violent aftermath caused by intervention.185 As this figure originated with Reporters 
without Borders and was reported by Amnesty International, both reputable 
organizations, then one can presume that it is accurate.186 Ted Carpenter cites the 
number of internally displaced people in 2016 and a 2017 airstrike that killed several 
civilians as evidence of Libya’s state of disarray after the intervention.187 While there 
may be a link from the intervention to the number of displaced people, Carpenter states 
that it is unknown who executed the airstrike and thus a causal relationship is unknown. 
The underlying theme to these claims is that the rebel use of violence and violence by 
others that occured in Libya after the intervention illustrate the harmful effects of the 
intervention. While violence perpetrated by rebels may prove that they are highly 
imperfect actors, it is impossible to prove that all violence by rebels and other actors 
after the intervention was a product of the intervention. Thus, while it is important to 
interrogate rebel violence, critics allow the timeline to continue for too long as there 
were too many confounding variables to prove a convincing link to the intervention. 
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Additional Investigations Further Reveal Rebel Violence
In addition to evidence put forth by critics, subsequent investigations have 
revealed additional violence perpetrated by rebel fighters. One must weigh the violence 
perpetrated by rebels to ultimately determine whether or not they were more harmful 
than the Gaddafi regime. 
A 2014 UN investigation revealed additional violence perpetrated by rebels 
during the war. The investigation determined that revolutionary forces killed an 
unknown number of Chadian nationals in Benghazi during late February and in 
Zawiyah, one Gaddafi solider was beaten to death and another hanged.188 More than a 
dozen additional killings were reported between February 22nd and 23rd of February as
well.189 In October of 2011, between 65 and 78 soldiers and alleged Gaddafi supporters 
were executed with their hands behind their backs in Sirte, Gaddafi’s home region.190 
The UN also confirmed the torture and killings of 12 prisoners, including Tawerghans, 
a Libyan minority.191 A Human Rights Watch report corroborates the violence 
perpetrated against the people of Tawergha, reporting that the city is now a ghost town 
and many civilian Tawerghans faced violence both during and after the intervention in 
apparent acts of retribution for the Tawerghan’s role in defending the Gaddafi regime.192
UN findings also included evidence of the use of torture by rebels. The UN 
confirmed that when rebels took control, they arrested former soldiers, officers, and 
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loyalists, torturing many and holding many without due process193 Torture was 
frequently used, often to extract confessions for alleged crimes.194 The UN reported 
targeting of Tawerghans persisting into February, 2012, with deaths including an 
elderly man, a woman, and three children in Tripoli.195 Rebels also targeted those 
perceived as foreigners in towns including Tiji, Badr, and Abu Kammesh, with at least 
six deaths confirmed amongst the cities by August, 2011 and reported evidence of the 
burning of buildings.196 The report also referenced beatings and an unspecified number 
of killings of Sub-Saharan Africans in Libya.197 The UN confirmed two instances of the 
sexual assault of two known Gaddafi loyalists, but further evidence of rebel use of 
sexual assault as a weapon was limited.198 Findings also included indiscriminate attacks 
on Sirte, as almost no building was left untouched by rebel attacks.199 Rebels also 
engaged in widespread pillaging during later phases of the conflict.200 In its survey of 
violence, the UN report also expresses concern at the lack of investigation into violence 
perpetrated by rebels after the conflict.201 The report describes the underlying notion that
“now it’s their turn,” often used to justify acts of retribution against those deemed loyal 
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to Gaddafi and used to justify the lack of investigations.202 Thus, there is significant 
evidence to support the fact that rebels engaged in violence that violated humanitarian 
law. While the UN found evidence for rebel violence, the human rights abuses and 
deaths inflicted by the Gaddafi regime were far more widespread and indiscriminate, 
ultimately pointing toward Gaddafi as the more harmful actor.  
A 2014 report by RAND found additional evidence of violence as well. Authors 
argue that due to the lack of a centralized authority, a “heavily armed populace,” and a 
slow rebuilding process, conflict increased in Libya in the months after the 
intervention.203 Additional problems arose in 2012 as the new government incorporated 
questionable actors into government such as the radical Islamist Abu Salim Martyrs 
Brigade, known for thir extremist views and harsh adherence to religious law.204 
Although members of the brigade were acting autonomously when they destroyed Sufi 
shrines in 2012 and attacked state ministries in 2013, the acts eroded government 
credibility as its members were engaging in violent acts.205 Brian McQuinn adds to this 
criticism, arguing that the militia’s lack of strong ties to the community made them 
more prone to conflict.206 The RAND report also references violent acts of retribution 
against both current and former government officials and rebels perpetrated by 
extremist groups.207 Violence persisted in 2012, as sporadic conflicts arose between 
202United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, 
A/HRC/19/68 (January 28, 2014), 18 and 21.
203Chivvis, Christopher, and Jeffery Martini,“Libya After Qaddafi: Lessons and Implications for the 
Future,” RAND Corporation, 2014, 20.
204Chivvis, Christopher, and Jeffery Martini,“Libya After Qaddafi: Lessons and Implications for the 
Future,” RAND Corporation, 2014, 18; Soufan Group, LIBYA, EXTREMISM, & THE CONSEQUENCES 
OF COLLAPSE, Report, Soufan Group, 2016.
205Chivvis, Christopher, and Jeffery Martini,“Libya After Qaddafi: Lessons and Implications for the 
Future,” RAND Corporation, 2014, 18. 
206McQuinn, Brian, “Assessing (In)Security after the Arab Spring: The Case of Libya,” PS: Political 
Science & Politics 46, no. 4 (2013): 2.
207Chivvis, Christopher, and Jeffery Martini,“Libya After Qaddafi: Lessons and Implications for the 
Future,” RAND Corporation, 2014, 29. 
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rebels and loyalists to the old regime, resulting in at least 147 reported deaths.208 RAND 
authors point out that, not only was violence damaging to the people, it interfered with 
other government action and eroded legitimacy of the government as it was unable to 
prevent violence.209 While additional findings of rebel violence reveal legitimate 
concerns about human rights abuses and killings, proportionally the amount of violence 
inflicted by rebels is far less than that inflicted by the Gaddafi regime. Thus, reports of 
rebel violence should be taken into account, but do not outweigh the crimes of the 
Gaddafi regime. 
208Chivvis, Christopher, and Jeffery Martini,“Libya After Qaddafi: Lessons and Implications for the 
Future,” RAND Corporation, 2014, 23.
209Chivvis, Christopher, and Jeffery Martini,“Libya After Qaddafi: Lessons and Implications for the 
Future,” RAND Corporation, 2014, 23.
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Assessing Criticisms of Unintended Consequences  
Additional criticisms of the intervention are varied but reveal legitimate security
issues in Libya. While these criticisms have potentially very serious implications, due to
the lack of evidence, they are too difficult to assess. In addition, due to the lack of 
significant harms caused by Operation Unified Protector, security issues are not proven 
to be more harmful than the Gaddafi regime. Thus, due to the lack of evidence and 
significant impacts, these criticisms are not central but warrant consideration. 
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Intervention Increased Terrorist Activity
Kuperman and Tierney both argue that instability and lack of central authority in
Libya provided a safe haven for terrorist groups in the state.210 Kuperman goes as far as 
to argue that the exacerbation of radicalism led to the attack on the US embassy in 
Benghazi in 2012 that resulted in the death of four US personnel.211 Kuperman may 
have some ground as those who launched the attack were also those who NATO 
supported in 2011.212 However, he does not prove that the attack was in response to the 
2011 intervention. In addition, while a tragic loss, the 2012 attack did not significantly 
destabilize Libya or the surrounding area and thus does not outweigh the large 
humanitarian threat in Libya. Kuperman also argues that the April 2013 bombing of a 
French embassy in Tripoli by extremists was a result of the intervention.213 As this 
attack is alleged to have been done by extremists, it is entirely plausible that foreign 
intervention prompted backlash and is thus at least partially responsible.214 However, 
once more, this attack was not significantly destabilizing and is therefore not a game-
changing issue. This is not to dismiss the losses in Libya but to ultimately argue that the
losses would have been far more numerous without intervention. 
210Kuperman, Alan, “Obama's Libya Debacle: How a Well-Meaning Intervention Ended in Failure,” 
Foreign Affairs, August 14, 2019; Kuperman, Alan,“Lessons from Libya: How Not to Intervene,” Belfer 
Center for Science and International Affairs,September 2013; Tierney, Dominic, “The Legacy of 
Obama’s ‘Worst Mistake,’” The Atlantic, April 15, 2016. 
211Kuperman, Alan, “Obama's Libya Debacle: How a Well-Meaning Intervention Ended in Failure,” 
Foreign Affairs, August 14, 2019; Kuperman, Alan,“Lessons from Libya: How Not to Intervene,” Belfer 
Center for Science and International Affairs,September 2013. 
212Kirpatrick, David, “A Deadly Mix in Benghazi,” The New York Times, December 28, 2013. 
213Kuperman, Alan, “Lessons from Libya: How Not to Intervene,” Belfer Center for Science and 
International Affairs, September 2013.
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2013. 
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Additional Findings of Increased Terrorist Activity
There is evidence to suggest that terrorists took advantage of the 2011 conflict; 
however there is little evidence that the intervention directly lead to widespread, 
destabilizing terrorist activity. RAND corroborates the notion that terrorist groups took 
advantage of instability during the war, claiming that an al Qaeda operative traveled to 
Libya in search of new recruits in the midst of conflict.215 RAND findings also conclude
that terrorists hoped to assert control during the war and used conflict to promote their 
own agendas, including engaging in violence.216 The report also includes the concern 
that terrorist groups resist authority, thus making reconstruction increasingly difficult.217
Notably, however, RAND reports that the total number of terrorists in Libya was not 
large and should not be exaggerated and that even more conservative Islamic groups in 
Libya did not support the extremist groups.218 Thus, it is true that there was terrorist 
activity during Operation Unified Protector but it is unclear that the operation is directly
responsible for an increase in widespread, destabilizing terrorist activity.
215Chivvis, Christopher, and Jeffery Martini,“Libya After Qaddafi: Lessons and Implications for the 
Future,” RAND Corporation, 2014, 28. 
216Chivvis, Christopher, and Jeffery Martini,“Libya After Qaddafi: Lessons and Implications for the 
Future,” RAND Corporation, 2014, 26.
217Chivvis, Christopher, and Jeffery Martini,“Libya After Qaddafi: Lessons and Implications for the 
Future,” RAND Corporation, 2014, 26.
218Chivvis, Christopher, and Jeffery Martini,“Libya After Qaddafi: Lessons and Implications for the 
Future,” RAND Corporation, 2014, 26.
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Intervention Led to Conventional Weapons Proliferation
Findings that some Libyan weapons went missing during the conflict raise 
additional concern about the harms of Operation Unified Protector. Unfortunately, there
is little information about how many weapons Gaddafi owned and what exactly went 
missing. In addition, Libyan weapons have not been proven to be major factors in 
additional conflicts. Therefore, while lost weapons reveal a security issue, they have not
been associated with significant harms. 
Additional concerns about the loss of weapons in conflict raises questions about 
the intervention’s outcome. Kuperman claims that “up to 15,000 man-portable, surface-
to-air missiles [were] leaked to radical Islamists throughout the region" and cites Peter 
Bouckaert, emergencies director at Human Rights Watch, stating "Peter Bouckaert of 
Human Rights Watch estimates that ten times as many weapons went loose in Libya as 
in Somalia, Afghanistan, or Iraq.”219 Kuperman accurately represents Bouckaert’s 
words; however, there is little evidence to support the notion that as many as 15,000 
missiles were leaked to terrorists.220 Kuperman also cites statistic stating that 5,000 
man-portable defense systems (MANPADs) were lost in Libya.221  However, he cites 
Peter Bouckaert, who himself along with Human Rights Watch has invalidated the 
claim.222 Interestingly, Benjamin Friedman also published an article with the Cato 
Institute, dispelling myths about the 20,000 SA-7 missiles rumored to be on the loose in
219Kuperman refers to man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADs), portable weapons capable of 
eliminating aircrafts. Kuperman, Alan, “Obama's Libya Debacle: How a Well-Meaning Intervention 
Ended in Failure,” Foreign Affairs, August 14, 2019.
220Speculations about a Libyan stockpile pile of 20,000 MANPADs have floated around but even this 
number is unconfirmed. As even the total number of MANPADs in Libya is unknown, there is little 
ground to claim that 15,000 weapons went missing. 
221Kuperman, Alan, “Obama's Libya Debacle: How a Well-Meaning Intervention Ended in Failure,” 
Foreign Affairs, August 14, 2019.
222Chivers, C.J.,“Confronting a False Meme: Libya's Deadly 'Stinger Equivalents,'” The New York Times,
May 24, 2012.
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Libya.223 Friedman states that that figure was not based on actual evidence, is 
significantly higher than existing estimates, and, even if Libya did have 20,000 SA-7 
missiles, many would likely be inoperable due to missing parts.224 Thus, there is 
concrete evidence of rebels in possession of MANPADs but it is likely untrue that 
thousands were lost in conflict.225 In addition, some photographs depict only partially-
built weapons which Eric Berman of the Small Arms Survey in Geneva stated could be 
inoperable due to missing parts, a lack of knowledge, or degradation over time.226 
227
Further analysis by the New York Times found that 20 weapons including SA-
7b Grails, were unaccounted for in Tripoli, with reports of rebels carrying weapons as 
223Friedman, Benjamin,“MANPADS Myths in Libya,” Cato Institute, May 29, 2012.
224Friedman, Benjamin,“MANPADS Myths in Libya,” Cato Institute, May 29, 2012.
225Chivers, C.J.,“Experts Fear Looted Libyan Arms May Find Way to Terrorists,” The New York Times, 
March 3, 2011.
226Chivers, C.J.,“Experts Fear Looted Libyan Arms May Find Way to Terrorists,” The New York Times, 
March 3, 2011.
227Tyler Hicks, A Libyan rebel carrying an SA-7, a shoulder-fired missile. Such missiles were part of the 
Libyan military’s supply of weapons, in C.J. Chivers, Experts Fear Looted Libyan Arms May Find Way 
to Terrorists, (New York Times, 2011).
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well.228 The Washington Post reports findings of Libyan weapons in Mali, Egypt, and 
Syria, complicating other conflicts.229 It is not clear how many weapons went missing in
Libya. However, it is clear that, while some did in fact disappear from Gaddafi’s 
arsenal, claims about disastrous numbers of weapons on the loose are likely inaccurate. 
Thus, this may be a factor detrimental to the intervention’s ability to be labeled as a 
total success but is likely not a game-changing issue.
228Nordland, Rod, and C. J. Chivers,“Heat-Seeking Missiles Are Missing From Libyan Arms Stockpile,” 
The New York Times, September 7, 2011.
229Hauslohner, Abigail,“Algerian Hostage Crisis Throws Spotlight on Spillover of Libyan War,” The 
Washington Post, January 18, 2013. 
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Intervention Hurt Nuclear Non-Proliferation Efforts
Concerns also arise over Operation Unified Protector’s effect on nuclear 
proliferation. Consequences for nuclear non-proliferation efforts are critical to consider;
however, the limited consequences for nuclear non-proliferation efforts ultimately do 
not outweigh the human need in Libya. As Muammar Gaddafi renounced Libya’s 
nuclear program in 2003, he became an example of international efforts to prevent 
nuclear proliferation. However, his rule still ended in death. Critics argue that the 
Gaddafi example was one that threatened other rulers such as Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 
Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un, thus hindering non-proliferation efforts. While this is a 
very serious issue, it does not overshadow the immediate, dangerous threat that the 
Gaddafi regime posed to Libyan civilians. 
Alan Kuperman rightfully highlights North Korea’s publication stating “The 
Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq and the Qaddafi regime in Libya could not escape the 
fate of destruction after being deprived of their foundations for nuclear development 
and giving up nuclear programs of their own accord,” as representative of the negative 
implications of the NATO intervention on international security.230 Likewise, Kuperman
references Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s statement echoing North Korea’s view of Libya as
an example of the dangers of nuclear concessions to the West.231 While lamentable that 
the overthrow of a dictator who had denuclearized hindered nuclear non-proliferation 
efforts, it is not clear that state behavior would be solely informed by the lessons in 
Libya. In addition, neither the situation in North Korea nor the situation in Iran clearly 
230Kuperman, Alan, “Obama's Libya Debacle: How a Well-Meaning Intervention Ended in Failure,” 
Foreign Affairs, August 14, 2019; Specia, Megan, and David E. Sanger. “How the 'Libya Model' Became 
a Sticking Point in North Korea Nuclear Talks.” The New York Times, May 16, 2018.
231Kuperman, Alan, “Obama's Libya Debacle: How a Well-Meaning Intervention Ended in Failure,” 
Foreign Affairs, August 14, 2019; Thakur, Ramesh, “Capping North Korea's Weapons and Iran's 
Capability,” Nuclear Weapons and International Security Collected Essays, Routledge, 2015, 148. 
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outweighs the immediate threat to human life and human rights in Libya. Therefore, 
while important to consider, the issue of the effects on nuclear non-proliferation is not 
sufficient to dismiss the entire intervention.      
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Summary  
Arguments against the intervention are strong in some areas but ask readers to 
make significant assumptions about the intervention’s effects, cite evidence that is 
ineffective, and include analysis of events that are disconnected from the intervention. 
Firstly, critics do not prove that the intervention increased human rights abuses and 
fatalities or that the rebels inflicted more damage than the Libyan government. This 
significantly weakens the case against intervention as it cannot be argued that Operation
Unified Protector made things proportionally worse for the Libyan people. Secondly, 
while the case against intervention exposes potential security issues, it is overall 
ineffective in proving Operation Unified Protector to have been an overwhelmingly 
harmful intervention. As the impacts of terrorist activity and conventional weapons 
proliferation have not been significantly harmful or destabilizing in Libya or the 
surrounding states, these issues are not sufficient to label the intervention as a failure. 
Similarly, while the impact on non-proliferation efforts was regrettable, it was not 
sufficient enough to outweigh the intervention’s aim of protecting human life and 
human rights. While relevant security issues, neither terrorist activity nor weapons 
issues are sufficient to outweigh human life and human rights. Thus it cannot be argued 
that the intervention worsened the humanitarian situation in Libya. Therefore, the next 
step is to reexamine the case for intervention. 
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V. Supporters Prove Urgent Humanitarian Threat in Libya     
Clear Threat to Benghazi 
     While Gaddafi did make one statement promising the humane treatment of 
civilians and a path out of the country, this statement must be viewed in the context of 
his past actions and other statements. Inflammatory statements such as Gaddafi’s vow 
to cleanse Libya and to “show no mercy to collaborators,” highlight the fact that there 
was indeed a grim fate awaiting those who defied the regime.232 Not only are Gaddafi’s 
words highly threatening, graffiti by government forces stating that troops would not 
forgive rebels and threatening women affiliated with the rebel side warn that, even if 
Gaddafi won, his supporters may have continued to inflict violence on the Libyan 
people.233 Gaddafi did state that he would show mercy to those who laid down their 
weapons. However his statements about completely eliminating the opposition and his 
extensive history of killing those who even conspired against him heavily weigh on the 
side that he would have sought to eliminate even those slightly connected to the  
revolution.234 As Gaddafi’s use of violence against rebels dates back to 1976 and as he 
used violence against peaceful protestors in February 2011, there is little to no evidence 
to suggest that he had had a change of heart and chose 2011 to be the time to allow 
challengers to live. Thus to take Gaddafi at his word that he would be merciful while 
ignoring his threats and history of violence seems unwarranted. 
Even if Gaddafi was merciful, rebels still would not have given in and thus 
conflict was inevitable and the West was faced with a choice to intervene or not. As 
232Heneghan, Tom, “UPDATE 1-Gaddafi Tells Benghazi His Army Is Coming Tonight,” Reuters, March 
17, 2011. 
233Rice, Xan,“Misrata Rebels Strike Back Against Gaddafi Snipers,” The Guardian, April 22, 2011.
234Al Jazeera English,“Gaddafi addresses Benghazi residents,” YouTube, March 17, 2011.
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rebels turned down peace proposals it appears that the conflict either had to end with the
ousting of Gaddafi or the complete, violent subdual of rebel forces. Thus, Gaddafi 
would have been forced to defend his regime against attacks and thus would likely have
responded in kind.235 Therefore, even if it is true that Gaddafi sought a peaceful 
resolution, he would have been forced to return to his old ways.
235Samantha Power briefly addresses this theory in her book The Education of an Idealist.
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Libyan State Violence Indicative of Harm to Come
Whereas critics claim that Gaddafi did not leave a path of destruction in his 
wake, death figures and reported human rights abuses indicate otherwise. Confirmation 
of violence against civilians, including indiscriminate killings, reveal that, despite 
Gaddafi’s claim to be merciful, state troops were actively harming and killing the 
civilian population. These findings ultimately prove that there was a humanitarian threat
to the Libyan people and thus the intervention was warranted to prevent further harm. 
Even before intervention, violence wracked the state. Initial violence is 
undisputed by critics and telling of what was to come. As the Libyan state reacted to 
peaceful protests with violence it became clear that the Gaddafi would use force to quell
any uprising. Thus, even initial violence was colored by a “win at all costs” mentality. 
While casualty reports from March to October vary greatly, confirmed reports of deaths 
are still sufficient to highlight a pattern of violence in Benghazi. Other offenses reported
were arbitrary detainments, torture, sexual violence, and general violence against 
civilians, further demonstrating a pattern of indiscriminate violence.236 In the face of 
verified violence, it is exceedingly difficult to argue that the Gaddafi regime was on a 
path to peaceful reconciliation and/or that troops were merciful in their treatment of 
noncombatants. 
Opponents of the intervention offer their own proof but it is not sufficient to 
disprove the humanitarian threat posed by the Gaddafi regime. Kuperman argues that in 
the first seven weeks of conflict in Misrata, of the 257 civilians killed, only 30 were 
women or children.237 However, the total of 630 deaths reported by WHO in June is 
236United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, 
A/HRC/19/68 (January 28, 2014), 14-15. 
237Kuperman, Alan, “Lessons from Libya: How Not to Intervene,” Belfer Center for Science and 
International Affairs, September, 2013.
63
more than double Kuperman’s figure; a second doctor reported that out of 250 deaths, 
many were civilians; and the UN received a statement from a senior military figure that 
the 32nd brigade gave instructions to shoot civilians.238 Thus, not only was there 
significantly more violence than Kuperman referenced but state troops were literally 
ordered to shoot noncombatants. Kuperman also argues that there was little retaliatory 
violence in all but one major city between March 5th and 15th once the state reclaimed 
power.239 However, conflict was still raging across the state on March 16th and thus, 
retaliatory violence or not, violence was likely still continuing with the same patterns of
harm inflicted on the Libyan people. The evidence supports the notion that conflict in 
Libya truly was harming civilians and that there was little proof to support the idea that 
state troops were merciful in their treatment of civilians. Therefore, there was a true 
humanitarian threat posed by Gaddafi. 
The final argument for intervention appears to be at least partially true, 
Operation Unified Protector sought to protect human life and rights from infringement 
by the Gaddafi regime and thus is accomplished its goal. As stated in Resolution 1973, 
the mandate was to “to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of 
resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of 
attack…”240 As NATO took steps to disarm the Gaddafi regime and supported rebels, it 
is clear that the operation made an effort to protect civilians and civilian populated areas
that were threatened. However, if it is true that the intervention led to increased human 
238Human Rights Watch,“Libya: Government Attacks in Misrata Kill Civilians,” Human Rights Watch, 
November 2, 2015.; United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the International Commission of
Inquiry on Libya, A/HRC/19/68 (January 28, 2014), 6; World Health Organization, “Libya crisis: August 
2011 Update,” World Health Organization, August, 2011.
239Kuperman, Alan, “Obama's Libya Debacle,” Foreign Affairs, August 14, 2019. 
240United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011), Imposes additional measures in connection 
with the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; establishes a Panel of Experts to assist in monitoring 
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rights abuses and deaths, then it follows that the intervention not only failed in its 
humanitarian goal but made the situation worse for the people of Libya. Thus, the final 
step is to determine if any violence can be linked to NATO and, if so, then if the harm 
done is worse than that done by Gaddafi.
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 VI. Unintended Consequences Insufficient to Condemn Entire Intervention 
Intervention Did Not Significantly Worsen Violence
While authors claim that conflict would have died out quickly and that 
intervention instead increased violence, evidence indicates that conflict was inevitable 
and the damage done by Gaddafi was far worse than that done by the rebels. While 
conflict had tempered in some areas in the east after six weeks, battles continued in 
other locations and therefore it is not provable, and even unlikely, that violence would 
have completely stopped without intervention. In addition, given the use of violence 
before the intervention and Gaddafi’s threats of violence, had the rebellion been 
crushed, then it likely would have been a bloody outcome for those in Gaddaf’s path. 
Authors also argue that prolonging the conflict led to an increase in death by as many as
ten times. However, this claim is not provable due to a lack of information. This claim 
also does not recognize that the Gaddafi regime would more than likely have continued 
attacks had NATO not intervened. Thus, it cannot be proven that NATO prolonged the 
conflict and/or resulted in ten times the number of deaths that would have otherwise 
occurred and it is even likely that violence would have been as bad or worse without 
intervention.  
Evidence also indicates that rebels inflicted violence and death on some in 
Libya; however, their crimes were significantly less widespread than Gadaffi’s and they
caused comparatively less harm overall. Confirmed rebel crimes include the killing of 
115 people plus an unknown number of Chadian nationals and Sub-Saharan Africans 
from February 2011 through 2012; the use of torture continuing into 2012; targeting of 
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perceived loyalists and foreigners; two confirmed rapes; and looting.241 These instances 
of violence mount perhaps the strongest case against rebels as the episodes are directly 
attributable to the rebels. By comparison, the most conservative estimate of 
government-perpetrated killings was 300 by February 23rd, 2011.242 Thus, as the 
Gaddafi regime was so overwhelmingly violent throughout the conflict, NATO 
intervention in opposition to the state was indeed a humanitarian mission.   
Despite some criticisms of NATO airstrikes, NATO was ultimately vindicated 
of any accusations of improper, violent conduct. Kuperman argues that NATO was 
indiscriminate in it’s attacks and Carpenter cited deaths as evidence of the 
intervention’s harm.243 While on a humanitarian level it is important to recognize the 72 
deaths that occurred, with the exceptions of a few attacks on which there was no 
sufficient information to draw conclusions, the 2014 UN investigation determined that 
NATO did not target civilians and took all necessary precautions to prevent civilian 
casualties.244 Thus it does not appear that criticisms of NATO as an irresponsible or 
even violent actor are accurate. 
Criticisms of violence in Libya occurring during and after 2012 are more 
questionable in their utility as evidence against the intervention. RAND’s findings of 
attacks perpetrated by extremist groups in 2012 and 2013 can certainly be used as 
evidence of strife in Libya, but holding NATO accountable for the actions of a group 
241Human Rights Watch,“Libya: Apparent Execution of 53 Gaddafi Supporters,” Human Rights Watch, 
October 24, 2011; United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the International Commission of
Inquiry on Libya, A/HRC/19/68 (January 28, 2014), 8. 
242Donadio, Rachel, “Italy Says Death Toll in Libya Is Likely Over 1,000,” The New York Times, 
February 23, 2011.
243Carpenter, Ted Galen, “Paved with Good Intentions." Mediterranean Quarterly 29, no. 4 (2018); 
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244United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the International Commission of
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that was not initially part of the rebel government does not seem to be a reasonable 
criticism given the timeline and initial government structure.245 The report also cites 
sporadic violence between rebels and loyalists that resulted in numerous deaths; 
however, as both parties engaged in conflict and underlying tensions would likely exist 
without NATO, then these conflicts do not significantly affect either side’s standing as 
responsible for violence.246 Reports of violence in 2014 and attacks on journalists also 
do little to support criticism of the intervention. As the composition of the Libyan 
government changed drastically during and after 2011and reported episodes were three 
years after NATO intervention, it is difficult to argue that the intervention directly 
caused these instances of violence due to the significant number of confounding 
variables. Further reports of violence in 2016 and 2017 also appear far too distant from 
the intervention to serve as evidence of its harm. In sum, due to the number of 
confounding variables and lack of direct links from late violence to the 2011 
intervention, it does not seem reasonable to hold NATO to hold accountable for other 
actors’ actions several years after the intervention. 
245Chivvis, Christopher, and Jeffery Martini, “Libya After Qaddafi: Lessons and Implications for the 
Future,” RAND Corporation, 2014, 18.
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No Significant Increase in Terrorism
Efforts to establish a link between the intervention and subsequent terrorist 
activity reveal a real security issue but fail to establish a causal relationship and fail to 
prove that this break in security led to significant harms in Libya or other states. The 
strongest claim is that an al Qaeda operative took advantage of conflict to recruit 
members and even engaged in violence. However, to claim that this is NATO’s fault 
ignores the fact that conflict began and continued without intervention. Thus, it is 
entirely possible that terrorists would have arrived in Libya with or without the 
intervention as war was already raging throughout the state. There is not a clear, 
provable conclusion about NATO’s effect on terrorist activity during the conflict. 
International presence during the intervention could have served as a deterrent against 
terrorist activity due to increased scrutiny of the area and more resources available to 
combat extremism, or, the lack of international troops on the ground could have negated
the international presence in the sky, as no one was actively combatting extremists on 
the ground in Libya.
Contrastingly, the lack of a strong authority, beginning in November 2011, 
absolutely made it more opportune for terrorists to grow their ranks. However, as the 
new government rejected international offers of military support, it is difficult to fault 
NATO for not doing more to prevent terrorist activity.247 In addition, the terrorist attacks
that did occur in 2012 and 2013 were not significantly destabilizing and thus do not 
provide adequate ground to call the entire intervention a failure. Furthermore, RAND 
found that the number of extremists in Libya was not overwhelming and that the groups
did not enjoy the support of even the most conservative Islamic political parties in 
247BBC,“Libya's Interim Leaders Reject UN Military Personnel,” BBC News, August 31, 2011.
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Libya.248 Therefore, there is little evidence that NATO was responsible for a significant 
increase in terrorist activity or that the Libyan people even accepted radical ideologies.  
248Chivvis, Christopher, and Jeffery Martini, “Libya After Qaddafi: Lessons and Implications for the 
Future,” RAND Corporation, 2014, 28. 
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Insufficient Evidence of Significant Conventional Weapons Proliferation
Lost weapons present a thornier problem as the threat is unknown due to a lack 
of knowledge about what weapons went missing. However, as the threat is unknown, 
one cannot make assumptions either way about this impact of the intervention. Firstly, 
the notion that weapons went straight into the hands of terrorists is unsubstantiated. It is 
possible and even likely that terrorists would attempt to obtain weapons during conflict 
but the claim that weapons were leaked to terrorists is a misrepresentation of the 
situation.While the threat of MANPADs is real as rebels have been photographed with 
partially-assembled weapons, the notion that Libya lost nearly 20,000 weapons to 
terrorists is completely unsubstantiated.249 Thus it would be inaccurate to claim that lost 
MANPADs were a significant, harmful outcome of intervention. Further concerns arose
over Gaddafi’s stockpile of weapons of mass destruction, including 9.5 tons of mustard 
gas; however, in August of 2011, Reuters reported speaking with a US official who 
stated that the UN and NATO had kept track of the stockpile of mustard gas and that the
stock was well guarded.250 In sum, it is unknown which weapons went missing in Libya 
and therefore one cannot make claims about what was lost or whether or not weapons 
went straight into the hands of terrorists. 
 The spillover of weapons to other states is also cause for concern as it indicates 
that some weapons did in fact slip through the cracks. Despite spillover, lost weapons 
have not been linked to significant increases in violence and thus have not had a 
substantially negative impact in other states. Reports of ethnic Tuaregs who served in 
249Chivers, C.J., “Confronting a False Meme: Libya's Deadly 'Stinger Equivalents'.” The New York 
Times, May 24, 2012; Chivers, C.J., “Experts Fear Looted Libyan Arms May Find Way to Terrorists.” 
The New York Times, March 3, 2011. 
250Zakaria, Tabassum, and Phil Stewart, “After the Fall, U.S. Concerned about Libyan Weapons,” 
Reuters, August 22, 2011.
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Gaddafi’s forces returning to Mali with weapons looted from Gaddafi’s stock highlight 
the spread of arms.251 However, as Gaddafi armed these fighters, one cannot blame 
NATO for the weapons proliferation. Then, in October 2011, an Egyptian official also 
reported the arrest of five groups attempting to smuggle arms from Libya into Egypt, 
including weapons described as antiaircraft weapons.252 While this is a clear break in 
security, there is not proof of significant harm. The New York times also reported the 
Qatari orchestration of arms transfers from Libyan militias to Syria rebel fighters, 
including weapons such as rifles, machineguns, rocket-propelled grenades, small arms 
ammunition, and mortar rounds.253 However, as Qatar was responsible for the transfer 
then the blame rests on the state, not NATO. It is unknown how many weapons may 
have been leaked to other actors as Gaddafi hid much of his stock from the international
community. However, Libyan weapons have not been proven to be the cause of new 
conflicts and have not been proven to have significantly worsened existing conflicts. 
While the fact that Libyan weapons have arrived in other states in cause for concern, 
there is not sufficient evidence to prove that this security issue led to harms significant 
enough to condemn the entire operation.  
251Walt, Vivienne, “War in Mali: France Can Bomb Militants, but Not Arms Routes,” Time, January 14, 
2013. 
252Kirkpatrick , David. “Egypt's Arrests of Smugglers Show Threat of Libya Arms.” The New York 
Times, October 13, 2011. 
253Chivers, C.J., et al. “In Turnabout, Syria Rebels Get Libyan Weapons.” The New York Times, June, 21 
2013. 
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Impacts on Nuclear Proliferation Do Not Outweigh Intervention’s Aims
The threat of nuclear proliferation is a critical security issue but the 
intervention’s impact on non-proliferation efforts do not outweigh the immediate 
humanitarian threat in Libya. It is also unclear that Operation Unified Protector alone 
conditioned the behavior of North Korea and Iran. North Korea and Iran’s prior 
decisions to pursue nuclear ambitions indicate that this intervention was not the sole 
cause of state behavior. In addition, North Korea’s indication of some willingness to 
cooperate with non-proliferation efforts and Iran’s compliance with the Iran Deal 
indicate that Operation Unified Protector was not the only factor informing decisions. 
Finally, the impacts the intervention had on non-proliferation efforts do not outweigh 
the real threat to human life and rights in Libya. While unfortunate that the intervention 
had negative implications for nuclear proliferation, the widespread threat to human life 
was both more immediate and had tangible impacts for many in Libya. Thus, the issue 
of nuclear proliferation is important to consider but does not outweigh the case for 
intervention.  
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Summary 
As Operation Unified Protector has not been linked to significant terrorist 
activity and/or significant harms resulting from lost weapons, one cannot dismiss the 
intervention on either of these grounds. The lack of causal links between the 
intervention and severe, destabilizing terrorist activity reveals that this issue, while a 
security threat, did not result in violence worse than that inflicted by the Gaddafi 
regime. Thus, Libya with the intervention remains preferable to one without, despite 
lost weapons. Similarly, while weapons proliferation reveals a lapse in security, this 
lapse did not cause significant harm and thus this issue is not severe enough to warrant 
condemnation of the entire operation. Finally, while the negative impacts the 
intervention had on nuclear non-proliferation efforts are lamentable, the issue does not 
clearly outweigh the humanitarian situation in Libya. These issues shed light on 
problems with intervention that states ought to anticipate but do not prove that 
Operation Unified Protector caused significant damage in terms of terrorism or weapons
proliferation. Thus, Operation Unified Protector remains the more preferable choice as 
opposed to no intervention. 
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VII. Final Assessments of Operation Unified Protector 
&
 Lessons for the Future
Supporters of Operation Unified Protector were correct. The weight of the 
evidence shows that Gaddafi was extremely likely to be violent and thus intervention 
did not allow him the opportunity to act. In contrast, critics lean on the most benign 
reading of Gaddafi’s words and of the evidence to paint a counterfactual that 
demonstratively downplays the deadly threat to the Libyan people. The dictator’s few 
statements promising to spare those who laid down their weapons pale in comparison to
his threats of destruction of those who dared oppose him, his history of violently 
oppressing rebels, and the actions of his troops which showed little differentiation 
between noncombatants and enemies. The threat to Benghazi, while not the only 
humanitarian threat in Libya, was also particularly salient as Gaddafi singled out the 
city, protests began there, and it was home to the original rebel government. Thus it was
extremely likely that Gaddafi would have inflicted extreme violence on the people in 
crushing dissent in Benghazi. In addition to Gaddafi’s violent rhetoric, the reports, 
testimony, and physical evidence of violence against civilians confirm that state troops 
endangered and harmed noncombatants across the state. Furthermore, the rebel refusal 
to accept any Libyan government that included Gaddafi indicates that the rebellion 
would not have ended quickly and thus would have resulted in conflict with or without 
NATO. Due to the inevitability of conflict, the intervention ultimately mitigated and 
prevented further harm from coming to the Libyan people. Given the unavoidable 
conflict, Gaddafi’s violent history, and state violence in early 2011, it is undeniable that 
civilians were at risk of harm by state troops.
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As human rights violations and casualties inflicted by rebels during the conflict 
were far less numerous than the violence of the Gaddafi regime and as subsequent 
violations have occurred after the rejection of international oversight by the new Libyan
government, supporting rebels over Gaddafi resulted in less harm to the Libyan people. 
While rebels cannot be considered to be completely peaceful, humanitarian actors, the 
number of reported murders and human rights abuses are far fewer than those 
committed by Gaddafi. It is also important to recall that the rebels were not all thugs, 
many were simply civilians protesting Gaddafi’s totalitarian regime. Thus, violent 
rebels should be held accountable for their crimes but the actions of comparatively few 
bad actors do not diminish the fact that the rebellion was one based on the populus’s 
desire for freedom and the rebels were less harmful for the people of Libya during the 
conflict. Ideally, NATO would have withdrawn support for and/or forced the 
prosecution of those rebels who violated human rights, but the few, albeit serious, 
violations do not mean that the entire intervention failed. 
Libya is currently in a state of disarray, but current strife is not clearly tied to 
Operation Unified Protector. As the rebel government unequivocally rejected UN offers
to put boots on the ground, it cannot be argued that NATO allowed for further harm of 
the Libyan people as the international community quite literally had no sway. In sum, 
despite human rights violations which should have been better addressed, NATO 
support of rebels was still the better path to peace due to proportionally less damage 
done and the only means of upholding the Responsibility to Protect as Gaddafi was the 
initial and primary violent actor. 
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While terrorist activity was not NATO’s fault, NATO should have done more to 
combat terrorism in Libya. As the conflict began without NATO and would have 
continued on, likely until Gaddafi crushed opposition, it cannot be argued that NATO 
created the breeding grounds for terrorism as the breeding ground were already there. 
However, NATO should have done more to prevent the spread of extremist ideology. 
Granted, options were limited as the interim government rejected foreign troops, but 
NATO could have put conditions on aid and/or launched/supported attacks on known 
extremist actors. 
Similarly, NATO did not cause weapons proliferation but also should have done
more to limit weapons proliferation. As Gaddafi hid much of his stock, it would be 
unreasonable to fault NATO for not securing the entirety of Libya’s arsenal, but more 
precautions should have been taken such as preemptively coordinating with rebels on 
the ground to secure weapons. However, as the US authorized Qatari arms shipments to 
Libya, the US is at fault for not doing more to secure the safe delivery of arms to 
approved actors. The fact that in December of 2012, there were no reported leaks from 
Qatar to unapproved actors was pure luck and indicates that the US should have done 
more to ensure secure delivery to approved actors.254 
The issue that Libyan weapons have surfaced in at least three other countries is 
greater cause for concern. While the spread of weapons in Mali by Tuaregs is 
regrettable, as they were Gaddafi’s fighters, NATO cannot be faulted as they were 
already in possession of the weapons. As the rebellion very likely would have continued
with or without NATO, then it is highly possible that that same group of fighters would 
254Risen, James, et al., “U.S.-Approved Arms for Libya Rebels Fell Into Jihadis' Hands,” The New York 
Times, December 5, 2012. 
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have been armed and then returned to Mali when Gaddafi no longer needed them. 
Similarly, as Qatar was the state responsible for the transfer of weapons from Libya to 
Syria, one cannot hold NATO accountable for the actions of the Qatari state.255 If 
anything, as the US was the actor that authorized arms transfers, it should have done 
more to ensure that Qatar transferred weapons responsibly. This still does not make the 
entire intervention as a failure. The weapons that illustrate a lack of security are those 
that were found being smuggled into Egypt. Once more, it is difficult to argue that 
NATO created the conditions for weapons loss as conflict very likely would have 
continued without NATO, given the stated rebel refusal to give in. However, the 
smuggling of weapons indicates that they were not secured and that they were not 
tracked, despite prior lessons learned from conflicts such as Iraq. Therefore, NATO 
should not be held accountable for all weapons lost but it can be held accountable for its
efforts to prepare for the fallout. But, as Libyan weapons have not been directly linked 
to increased violence as a causal factor, this issue does not make Operation Unified 
Protector a failure. 
It is undeniable that Libya is currently in a state of disarray, but that is not due to
Operation Unified Protector. The international community pursued its stated goal of 
protecting human life and human rights, contributed to the disarmament and end of the 
Gaddafi regime, and offered international oversight to the new leaders. Current issues 
are largely due to a fragmented government and a decline in economic prosperity due to
said lack of solid government. It would be remiss to dismiss existing problems in Libya,
but one cannot hold NATO responsible for every bad thing that happened in Libya post-
255Chivers, C.J., et al, “In Turnabout, Syria Rebels Get Libyan Weapons,” The New York Times, June 21, 
2013; Risen, James, et al, “U.S.-Approved Arms for Libya Rebels Fell Into Jihadis' Hands,” The New 
York Times, December 5, 2012. 
78
2011. While Friedman argues that, without intervention, Libya could have kept its death
toll as low as 1/5 the death toll in Syria, it is more likely that Libya would have turned 
into another Syria without intervention.256 Just as the international community has 
watched Bashar al-Assad terrorize the Syrian people, the alternative to intervention 
would have been allowing the Gaddafi regime to continue terrorizing the Libyan 
people, likely allow for opposition purges similar to those he executed in the past, and 
to refortify its authoritarian regime. Thus, there is work to be done in improving 
intervention tactics but Operation Unified Protector was not the abject failure that some 
claim it was and perhaps even prevented Libya from spiraling even further. 
Ideally, the international community would do more to ensure a smooth 
transition of power, but when the domestic actors refuse military assistance, then it is 
hard to blame the world for not enforcing change. Should the international community 
have had more sway, then following the Department of State’s blueprint for 
reconstruction in Iraq post-Saddam Hussein would have been helpful. The blueprint 
calls for addressing the old regime’s crimes through open reconciliation processes, 
victim compensation, reviewing old laws and removing ones that violate human rights, 
the rebuilding of trust and integrity in institutions, the re-education and training of 
professionals to promote values of public service and individual rights, and the 
promotion of civil society in various spheres such as education and the media.257 
Through the reconfiguration of the state and civil society, then the transition from a 
self-serving, violent regime to one that truly serves citizens may have been smoother. 
256Friedman, Benjamin, “No, the Libya Intervention Wasn't a Humanitarian Success,” Cato Institute, 
April 7, 2016. 
257United States of America, Department of State,“The Road to Re-Establishing Rule of Law and 
Restoring Civil Society,” The Future of Iraq Project, 2002.
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While the United Nations mandate in Libya has had a role in reconstruction, limited 
enforcement capabilities severely detract from international oversight abilities. Thus it 
is difficult to blame NATO, but mirroring the plan formulated for Iraq likely would 
have been beneficial for reconstruction in Libya. 
Major areas of possible improvement include increased efforts to combat 
terrorism and increased efforts to minimize weapons proliferation. Regarding terrorism 
during the conflict, international actors should have done more in combatting extremist 
actors. This could have been in a manner similar to the Iraq plan, tasking domestic 
groups with combatting terrorism in the post-Gaddafi regime.258 Post-conflict, the 
Libyan government has cooperated with international actors in coordinating anti-
terrorist efforts and, while there is always more to be done, the global community 
cannot be faulted for not trying to prevent terrorism as it was actively trying to do just 
that.259 Regarding weapons proliferation during the conflict, the international 
community should have taken further steps to identify and secure weapons, secure 
borders, and perhaps even task domestic actors with securing arms. Following the Iraq 
outline, this would have involved assembling a list of groups known to have weapons, 
the collection of arms, and the safe storage and/or destruction of collected weapons.260 
NATO has been lucky that Libyan weapons have not been tied to starting new conflicts 
but the international community cannot afford to be careless with its interventions in the
future. The issue of reconstruction was particularly challenging in Libya as the new 
government did not allow for international enforcement. However, NATO could have at
258United States of America, Department of State,“The Road to Re-Establishing Rule of Law and 
Restoring Civil Society,” The Future of Iraq Project, 2002, 45. 
259United States of America, US Embassy in Libya, “Country Report on Terrorism 2013– Libya.” 2013. 
260United States of America, Department of State,“The Road to Re-Establishing Rule of Law and 
Restoring Civil Society,” The Future of Iraq Project, 2002, 35. 
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least put in motion efforts to combat terrorism and weapons proliferation. Despite some 
issues, these are still not damaging enough shortcomings to warrant labeling the 
intervention a failure.
Ultimately, Operation Unified Protector was justified in its goal of countering 
state violence against Libyan civilians and future interventions should not be ruled out 
based on Libya. In the wake of the Arab Spring, conflict was inevitable as rebels fought 
back against state violence. Thus, the international community made the decision to 
uphold a commitment to human life and rights by opposing the overwhelmingly violent 
state. The intervention also protected human life as Gaddafi was not able to “cleanse” 
Libya city by city. Given the fatalities and human rights abuses throughout the conflict 
perpetrated by the Gaddafi regime, it is clear that a grim fate awaited rebels had Gaddafi
been allowed to reach them. Thus, the intervention was both necessary and beneficial to
the Libyan people. 
Admittedly, the intervention was not without fault. Significant issues include 
rebel-perpetrated violence, increased terrorist activity, weapons proliferation, and 
Libya’s current state of disarray. While rebel-perpetrated violence is not negligible, 
rebel groups inflicted significantly less harm on the Libyan people than the Gaddafi 
regime. In addition, rebels were ultimately the side fighting on behalf of human life and 
rights in opposition to the violent dictator. Thus, supporting rebels was both a means of 
mitigating state violence and supporting the Libyan people in their demands for 
autonomy and security. Terrorist activity and weapons proliferation are also important 
issues that revealed breakdowns in security. However, no significant harm came from 
either the increase in terrorist activity or the proliferation of weapons. Therefore, these 
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issues reveal areas that require scrutiny but do not prove that Operation Unified 
Protector did more harm than good. Instead, the international community can apply 
lessons learned in Libya to anticipate and prevent security issues in future humanitarian 
crises. 
As Operation Unified Protector both prevented state troop advancement and 
assisted rebels in combatting state forces, the intervention upheld its commitment to 
human life and rights. The intervention was imperfect but ultimately prevented Gaddafi 
from unleashing violence on the Libyan people. Had NATO not intervened, there would
not have been anything in the way of state troops continuing their pattern of violence 
against armed rebels and civilians alike. Thus, NATO did truly prevent further violence 
by halting the Gaddafi regime. Therefore, Operation Unified Protector ultimately 
upheld its goal and supported civilians in their battle for independence and safety. 
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VIII. Appendix A
As more data on the number of deaths during the conflict has become available, 
patterns of state violence against civilians become increasingly clear. The disparity in 
killings done by rebels versus those done by the Libyan government clearly illustrates 
the enormous threat that the Libyan people faced. Despite significant variation in 
numbers, the total number of people who died at the hands of the state is enormous in 
comparison to confirmed killings by rebels. While rebels crimes are by no means 
excusable, it is clear that the rebels were not terrorizing the Libyan people to the extent 
that state troops were. Critics rightfully shed light on the violence and killings 
perpetrated by rebel forces, but the numbers clearly illustrate that claims of the rebels as
comparably violent and/or deadly to the Gaddafi regime greatly exaggerated rebel 
violence. Not only do deaths illustrate immense state violence, they also indicate that 
the state was killing significant numbers of people across Libya. Thus, posing a threat to
Libyan civilians statewide. Ultimately, the number of deaths both illustrates that 
civilians were at extreme risk of harm and that the Gaddafi regime was a far greater 
threat than the rebels were to Libyans. 
Statewide Deaths
Date Source Deaths 
2/14/11–2/19/11 Libyan Rebels, Reported by Al
Jazeera261
100+
02/16/11–2/25/11 Human Rights Watch Employee262 420-430
 2/17/11 Al Jazeera263 12+
2/17/11–2/19/11 Human Rights Watch264 49
261Al Jazeera, “'Many Killed' in Libya's Benghazi,” Al Jazeera, February 20, 2011
262Downie, James. “When Numbers Lie.” The New Republic, March 31, 2011. 
263Al Jazeera, “Battle for Libya: Key Moments,” Al Jazeera, April 30 2017. 
83
2/22/11 International Coalition Against War
Criminals265
519
2/22/11–2/23/11 United Nations266 12+*
2/23/11 Human Rights Watch267 300
2/23/11 Franco Frattini, Italian Foreign
Minister268
1,000
2/25/11 United Nations269 1,000
August, 2011 United Nations270 6*
End of Conflict US Official, Reported by Alan
Kuperman271
8,000 total
End of Conflict Libyan Ministry of Martyrs and
Missing Persons272
9,400 total 
End of Conflict Libyan Ministry of Martyrs and
Missing Persons273
11, 500 total,
including people
missing
End of Conflict Human Rights Watch274 72+**
End of Conflict United Nations275 Unspecified
264Human Rights Watch, “Libya: Security Forces Kill 84 Over Three Days,” Human Rights Watch, 
February 18, 2011.
265Vilmer, Jean-Baptiste Jeangène. “Ten Myths About the 2011 Intervention in Libya.” The Washington 
Quarterly 39, no. 2 (2016): 23-43. 
266United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, 
A/HRC/19/68 (January 28, 2014), 8.
267Donadio, Rachel, “Italy Says Death Toll in Libya Is Likely Over 1,000.” The New York Times, 
February 23, 2011.
268Donadio, Rachel, “Italy Says Death Toll in Libya Is Likely Over 1,000.” The New York Times, 
February 23, 2011.
269United Nations, Security Council, 6490th mtg., UN Doc. S/PV.6490 (February 15, 2011), 2. 
270United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, 
A/HRC/19/68 (January 28, 2014), 12-13. 
271Kuperman, Alan, “Obama's Libya Debacle: How a Well-Meaning Intervention Ended in Failure,” 
Foreign Affairs, August 14, 2019.
272Kuperman, Alan, “Obama's Libya Debacle: How a Well-Meaning Intervention Ended in Failure,” 
Foreign Affairs, August 14, 2019.
273Kuperman, Alan, “Obama's Libya Debacle: How a Well-Meaning Intervention Ended in Failure,” 
Foreign Affairs, August 14, 2019.
274Human Rights Watch, “NATO: Investigate Civilian Deaths in Libya,” Human Rights Watch, May 14, 
2012.
275United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, 
A/HRC/19/68 (January 28, 2014), 8.
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Number*
2012 RAND Corporation276 147+***
2014 Alan Kuperman277 49***
2017 Ted Carpenter 278 15+***
    *Rebel Perpetrated | **Result of UN airstrikes 
    ***Perpetrator Unknown | Total: All Deaths in Libya  
Al Khums Deaths
Date Source Deaths 
6/6/11 United Nations279 18
Al Qalaa Deaths
Date Source Deaths
July, 2011 United Nations280 34
Bab al Azizia Deaths
Date Source Deaths 
2/23/11 United Nations281 15
276Chivvis, Christopher, and Jeffery Martini,“Libya After Qaddafi: Lessons and Implications for the 
Future,” RAND Corporation, 2014, 23.
277Kuperman, Alan, “Obama's Libya Debacle: How a Well-Meaning Intervention Ended in Failure,” 
Foreign Affairs, August 14, 2019. Corroborated by the UN: United Nations, Office of the High 
Commissioner, Overview of Violations of International Human Rights and International humanitarian 
Law During the Ongoing Violence in Libya (September 4, 2014). 
278Carpenter, Ted Galen, “Paved with Good Intentions." Mediterranean Quarterly 29, no. 4 (2018). 
279United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, 
A/HRC/19/68 (January 28 2014), 7.
280United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, 
A/HRC/19/68 (January 28 2014), 7. 
281United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, 
A/HRC/19/68 (January 28 2014), 7. 
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Benghazi Deaths 
Date Source Deaths 
2/15/11 Al Jazeera282 1
2/15/11 Human Rights Watch283 1
2/17/11–2/20/11 Al Jazeera284 400
2/17/11–2/19/11 Human Rights Watch285 35
Late February United Nations286 Unspecified
Number*
9/11/12–9/12/12 Alan Kuperman287 4**
    *Rebel Perpetrated | **Terrorists, Formerly Rebels 
Misrata Deaths
Date Source Deaths
3/23/11 Libyan Rebels288 16
4/11/11 United Nations Children’s Fund289 20
4/11/11 The Guardian290 4
4/20/11 Human Rights Watch291 2
May, 2011 Misratan Doctors292 1,000
282 Al Jazeera, “Battle for Libya: Key Moments,” Al Jazeera, April 30 2017.
283Human Rights Watch, “Libya: Arrests, Assaults in Advance of Planned Protests,” Human Rights 
Watch, April 17, 2015. 
284Al Jazeera, “'Many Killed' in Libya's Benghazi,” Al Jazeera, February 19, 2011. 
285Human Rights Watch, “Libya: Security Forces Kill 84 Over Three Days,” Human Rights Watch, 
February 18, 2011.
286United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, 
A/HRC/19/68 (January 28, 2014), 8.
287Kuperman, Alan, “Obama's Libya Debacle: How a Well-Meaning Intervention Ended in Failure,” 
Foreign Affairs, August 14, 2019; Kuperman, Alan,“Lessons from Libya: How Not to Intervene,” Belfer 
Center for Science and International Affairs,September 2013. 
288Ahmed, Hamid Ould, “Rebels Say 16 Dead in Misrata, Hospital Attacked.” March 23, 2011.
289United Nations Children’s Fund, “UNICEF Calls for an Immediate End to the Siege of Misrata,” April 
11, 2011. 
290Sherwood, Harriet. “Libya Unrest: Thousands of Children Caught in the Crossfire in Misrata.” April 
11, 2011. 
291Human Rights Watch,“Libya: Journalists Killed in Misrata,” Human Rights Watch, April 20, 2011. 
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May, 2011 Alan Kuperman293 257 
June, 2011 World Health Organization294 630 
Sirte Deaths
Date Source Deaths
October, 2011 United Nations295 65-78*
   *Rebel Perpetrated
Tripoli Deaths
Date Source Deaths
2/20/11–2/21/11 United Nations296 200+
August, 2011 United Nations297 133
February, 2012 United Nations298 5*
   *Rebel Perpetrated
Unspecified Location Deaths
Date Source Deaths
February, 2011 United Nations299 12+*
   *Rebel Perpetrated
Zawiya Deaths
Date Source Deaths
2/23/11 United Nations300 7
292Taylor, Alan, “Three Months of Civil War in Libya,” The Atlantic, May 25, 2011; Al Jazeera, “Battle 
for Libya: Key Moments,” Al Jazeera, April 30 2017.     
293Kuperman, Alan, “Lessons from Libya: How Not to Intervene,” Belfer Center for Science and 
International Affairs, September 2013. 
294World Health Organization, “Libya crisis: August 2011 Update,” World Health Organization, August, 
2011. 
295United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, 
A/HRC/19/68 (January 28, 2014), 8.
296United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, 
A/HRC/19/68 (January 28 2014), 6. 
297United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, 
A/HRC/19/68 (January 28 2014), 7. 
298United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, 
A/HRC/19/68 (January 28, 2014), 12. 
299United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, 
A/HRC/19/68 (January 28, 2014), 8.
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February United Nations301 2*
   *Rebel Perpetrated
Zintan Deaths 
Date Source Deaths 
End of Conflict United Nations302 55
300United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, 
A/HRC/19/68 (January 28 2014), 6.
301United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, 
A/HRC/19/68 (January 28, 2014), 8.
302United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, 
A/HRC/19/68 (January 28 2014), 15. 
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